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Several decades of conflict, rebellion and unrest severely weakened civil society in parts of Colombia. 
Desarrollo y Paz is the umbrella term used to describe the set of locally-led initiatives that aim at addressing 
this problem through initiatives to promote sustainable economic development and community cohesion 
and action. 
 
In this paper we analyse the findings from a series of ‘public good’ games that were conducted between 
November 2005 and February 2007 in 104 municipalities in rural and urban Colombia with mainly poor 
participants. The data covers municipalities both with (‘treatment’) and without (‘control’) a PRDP in place, 
and within the ‘treatment’ municipalities, both beneficiaries and non beneficiaries of the PRDP initiative. 
The data for ‘control’ municipalities was collected as part of the evaluation of Familias en Accion (FeA), 
Colombia’s conditional cash transfer programme.  
The game is structured as a typical free-rider problem with the act of contributing to the ‘public good’ (a 
collective money pot) being always dominated by non-contribution. We interpret contribution as an act 
consistent with a high degree of social capital.  
Potentially endogenous selection into the programme makes identifying programme effects difficult but we 
find strong and suggestive evidence that exposure to PRDPs improve social capital and that this extends 
beyond direct beneficiaries of the programme. In particular, the duration of programme operation and the 
proportion  of  programme  beneficiaries  in  a  game  session  increase  contribution  to  the  public  good, 
suggesting that in order to have a major impact the programme must be sufficiently ‘intensive’.    
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
Several decades of conflict, rebellion and unrest have severely weakened civil society in 
Colombia. The legacy of past and ongoing violence has led to a weakened economy 
(Cardenas, 2002; Echeverry et al., 2001; Riascos & Vargas, 2004), and citizens that may 
have difficulty interacting with and trusting those outside their immediate social group, 
and engaging with local and national government agencies and organisations. Desarrollo y 
Paz is the umbrella term used to describe the set of locally-led initiatives that aim at 
addressing  these  problems  through  programmes  to  promote  sustainable  economic 
development and community cohesion and action. Ultimately, the Programas Regionales de 
Desarrollo y Paz (PRDPs) aim to foster an increase in social capital, to encourage the 
formation of social networks across social divides and to therefore increase the degree of 
trust between individuals. When individuals can trust each other, contracting can be less 
costly  and  fewer  resources  devoted  to  enforcement,  thereby  aiding  economic 
development. Similarly, a community linked through trust and collective organisations is 
likely  to  be  able  to  envisage  and  implement  better  strategies  to  manage  and  resolve 
potential conflict, leading to a fall in violence levels.  
 
But how can one measure the impact of a programme designed to improve this ‘social 
capital’? One could attempt to measure a final output, economic activity or human rights 
violations, for instance. However, this is difficult both for reasons of data collection 
(particularly  at  the  sub-regional  level),  and  because  improvements  in  behaviours 
associated with social capital may be considered an end unto themselves (for instance, by 
making future conflict less likely). With this in mind, a significant literature focuses on 
analysing measures of civic engagement (e.g. voting behaviour, group membership) (see 
Helliwell  &  Putnam,  1995  and  Putnam,  2000,  for  instance)  and  survey  responses 
designed to elicit trust and trust-worthiness (see Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2001, for 
instance).  However,  economists  and  psychologists  have  increasingly  made  use  of 
experimental methods; specially designed games, often with real payoffs, that allow the 
researcher  to  analyse  the  determinants  of  cooperative  (or  indeed,  uncooperative) 
behaviour (Barr & Genicot, 2007; Fearon et al., 2009; Karlan, 2005; Mosley & Verschoor, 
2005). 
 
In this paper we analyse the findings from a series of ‘public good’ games that were 
conducted in 104 rural and urban municipalities in Colombia between November 2005 
and February 2007, with most participants being poor. The data covers municipalities 
both  with  (‘treatment’)  and  without  (‘control’)  a  PRDP  in  place,  and  within  the 
‘treatment’  municipalities,  both  beneficiaries  and  non  beneficiaries  of  the  PRDP 
initiative. The data for ‘control’ municipalities was collected as part of the evaluation of 
Familias en Accion (FeA), Colombia’s conditional cash transfer programme.    3 
 
The game is structured as a typical free-rider problem with the act of contributing to the 
‘public good’ (a collective money pot) being always dominated by non-contribution. The 
game is played twice, with a short group discussion between participants taking place 
between the first and second round. We take the act of contribution to the collective 
money-pot as our measure of social capital – a willingness to forgo a private return for 
the social good, and to coordinate with other players to contribute and act in a reciprocal 
manner despite the incentive not to.  
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the PRDPs and the data. 
Section  3  describes  in  more  detail  the  public  goods  game  and  provides  some  basic 
descriptive statistics for game-play. Section 4 provides an analysis of the effect of the 
PRDPs on collective action, firstly using a comparison between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries in areas where the programme was running, and then by comparing with 
‘control’ municipalities. Finally, Section 5 offers our conclusions.  
 
 
Section 2: Desarrollo y Paz and the Survey Data 
 
2.1 The Setting. Civil Conflict in Colombia 
 
Colombia has been affected by a complex civil conflict in recent decades. The drivers of 
the conflict have evolved with time, from the historical rivalry between opposing parties, 
through the confrontation between the state and left wing revolutionary groups, to the 
fight  for  the  control  over  natural  resources  and  the  profits  of  the  coca  industry. 
Kidnapping,  selective  assassinations  and  internal  displacement  are  amongst  the  most 
evident consequences of this endless stream of violence. Murder rate stands at 37 over 
100.000, the 10th  highest in  the  world, and  U.N.  sources  report at least  1.8  million 
Colombians internally displaced by the conflict (UNHCR, 2006).
1 The human rights of 




                                                 
1 According  to  the  Committee  on  Human  Rights  and  Displacement  (CODHES),  a  nongovernmental 
organization monitoring displacement, the number of the number of internally displaced people since 1985 
is 2.8 million, and the first half of 2008 marked the highest rate of displacement in Colombia in 23 years, 
with more than 270,000 people displaced in six months. 
2 Human Rights Watch reports that 41 unionists were killed in 2008 (Source: Escuela Nacional Sindacal). 
Nearly two dozen candidates were assassinated prior to last regional and local elections in 2007 (source 
UNHCR).   4 
In contrast to a typical ethnic conflict setting, where the whole of society itself is sharply 
divided along ethnic lines, the Colombian conflict is driven by a groups of ‘outsiders’ 
fighting  between  themselves  for  power  and  threatening  the  vast  majority  of  the 
population, which is passively affected by its consequences. The scene of the recent 
conflict  has  been  dominated  by  two  main  illegal  factions:  the  Guerrilla(s)  and  the 
paramilitaries. Both are complex organizations that, despite the relatively small number 
of members, have managed to control vast parts of the territory, infiltrate society and 
engage in several illegal activities, exploiting the weakness of public institutions. 
 
In recent years these traditional groups have disintegrated into smaller factions and the 
state have regained control over large parts of the country. However, extreme violence is 
still concentrated in several areas, especially isolated rural districts. In these ‘clusters’ the 
threat of violence and weakness of the state are corrosive for social capital. And indeed 
there is a strong association between the presence of illegal groups and violence levels, 
local political instability, inequality and poor social outcomes at the local level (Sanchez et 
al., 2003).  
 
Household living in conflict zones suffer repeated losses of physical, human and social 
capital, leading to a condition of assets depletion which is extremely hard to recover 
from, as the state fails to provide essential public goods, and the traditional mechanisms 
of mutual support are jeopardized by the violence (Engel & Ibañez, 2007; Ibañez & 
Moya, 2009; McIlwaine & Moser, 2000). 
 
Traditionally,  the  Government  has  tackled  the  conflict  with  an  approach  based  on 
security operations and military confrontation. In this context, the PRDPs represent an 
aim to at building peace ‘from the bottom up’, as it is described in the next section. 
 
 
2.2 The initiative. Desarrollo y Paz 
 
Desarrollo y Paz  is the umbrella term used to describe a set of projects run at the regional 
and local level with the aim of fostering the accumulation of social capital amongst those 
Colombians  worst  affected  by  civil  conflict.  It  consists  of  networks  of  grassroots 
organizations that were formed  in  some  of the  poorest  and  most  violent  regions of 
Colombia under the auspices of key civil society stakeholders (labour unions, the church, 
private foundations, etc.) in an attempt to re-establish peace and promote development.  
   5 
Based  on  a  community  driven  approach,  the  PRDPs  claim  that  peace  is  a 
multidimensional and a multilevel concept.
3  It cannot be  achieved by military means 
alone,  but  is  rather the result of  a cohesive society   with functioning and inclusive 
institutions, the potential for collective engagement, and the prospect of development 
which  benefits  more  than  an  elite .  By  attacking  the  socioeconomic  and  cultural 
conditions which cause and perpetuate the conflict locally, the PRDPs hope to reshape 
social and economic patterns along the principles of equity, solidarity and inclusiveness. 
Indeed they claim that peace can only be sustainable if it is constructed ‘from the bottom 
up’. By strengthening the social fabric and promoting democratic participation, PRDPs 
expect to empower communities so that they become masters and actors of their own 
development. Newly empowered communities may, for example, have the capacity and 
confidence to engage with illegal groups, and may demand the protection of human life 
and rights. This would weaken the hold of the illegal groups over the political, social and 
economic life of afflicted areas.  
 
The Desarrollo y Paz initiative started in the early 90s in Magdalena Medio, but has rapidly 
expanded in many other regions of the country. Since then, the PRDPs have gained 
sufficient  credibility  to  engage  with  local  and  national  governments  and  major 
international donors.
4 6 PRDPs in the regions of Magdalena Medio, Maciso Colombiano, 
Norte de Santander, Oriente Antioqueno,  Montes de Maria   and Meta
5 have been 
supported by the World Bank and the European Commission, with a total estimated 
investment of more than $180 million.
6  
 
These resources are managed and executed at the regional level  where the PRDPs act as 
an umbrella fund, supporting a very heterogeneous set of initiatives in the communities 
that pertain to 3 main axis of action:  
a) Productive Development;  
b) Institutional Development and Governance, and;  
c) Human Rights and ‘Culture of Peace’. 
 
                                                 
3 For  a  theoretical  discussion  on  the  concept  of  peace  and  its  relevance  to  PRDPs’  philosophy  of 
intervention see Galtung (1996) and Lederach (2007). 
4 Although they are not governmental programmes, they are endorsed in the National Development Plan 
and the Presidential Secretary for Social Affairs of the Colombian Government (Acción Social) coordinates 
their funding. 
5 Additional to these 6, there are other 18 PRDPs in Colombia. All of them are confederated in the Red 
Prodepaz (www.redprodepaz.org.co). 
6 The support from the World Bank consisted in two Learning and Innovation Grants (LIL1 and LIL2) 
from 1998 to 2003 and the Paz y Desarrollo Loan from 2004-2008. The European Commission supports the 
PRDPs through Laboratorios de Paz I, II and III, its main international cooperation strategy in Colombia, 
covering 2002-2010 period. 
   6 
Under the first category fall several types of micro-enterprise projects, especially in the 
agriculture  sector.  They  are  nearly  always  producer  cooperatives,  and  often  involve 
collective land ownership. Most projects combine a strategy for commercial production 
of a leading cash-crop (e.g. palm oil, coffee, cocoa, raspberry, cattle, etc.) with a focus on 
food security and sustainable environmental management.  
 
In  the  domain  of  Institutional  Development  and  Governance,  the  PRPDs  promote 
community health and education initiatives as well as water and sanitation projects. They 
also support several initiatives in the domain of active citizenship, by building up and 
strengthening  social  networks  for  civic  participation,  promoting  engagement  in 
participative  planning  and  budgeting  exercise  and  encouraging  transparency  and 
accountability in public decision making.  
 
Finally, projects in the third axis of Culture of Peace range from the promotion of non-
violence and mediation for the resolution of disagreement, to the setting up of Espacios 
Humanitarios (spaces for civil resistance, early alert system and institutional coordination 
for the management of humanitarian crisis), to the support  of community radio and 
initiatives for the preservation of local traditions and identity.  The latter is seen as a 
stabilising ‘buffer’, that will provide a sense of community and ‘belonging’ that makes 
violence less likely and forms the foundation of collective action.  
 
All these projects are promoted, formulated and executed by grassroots organizations in 
a participatory way. Through the projects, local communities are able to express their 
own views and set their priorities (‘la vida que queremos’) and beneficiaries are normally 
members of the grassroots organizations.  
 
The Government  estimates that in  the  6 mentioned  regions  (118 municipalities),  the 
PRDPs fund 1363 projects, working with approximately 800 grassroots organizations 










                                                 
7 Source: Sistema de Seguimiento de los Programas Paz y Desarrollo y Laboratorios de Paz, Acción Social, 
Gobierno de Colombia.   7 

















Despite the diversity of projects, the consistent principle of the PRDPs is the primacy of 
building positive social networks and community organisational capacity. They consider 
all  projects  as  an  opportunity  to  (re)establish  bonds  of  trust  amongst  people.  By 
rebuilding social networks (amongst grassroots organizations, amongst women, youths, 
between people and the public institutions, etc.) they aim to promote new community 
level  leaderships  and  new  ‘institutions’.  Finally  they  hope  that  this  community  wide 
process will make collective action possible again. 
 
Our approach to evaluating the programme’s effectiveness is based on a specific measure 
of social capital that fits this theory of change: the ability to engage in collective action 
and contribute to local public goods. 
 
 
2.3 Data  
 
In  an  effort  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  the  PRDPs,  a  survey  and  a  set  of 
experimental  games  were  undertaken  in  winter  2006.  The  evaluation  was  led  by  the 
Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP) in Colombia, with funding from the European 
Commission and the World Bank.
8 The survey covered a sample of 37 municipalities in 5 
                                                 
8 The design of the evaluation and data collection were undertaken by the Consortium SEI-Econometría-
IFS. The evaluation plan includes 2 rounds of data collection and a mixed qualitative-quantitative methods 
approach. The main results of the first phase of the evaluation are presented in a comprehensive policy   8 
regions
9, and included both direct beneficiaries of the programme, and no n-beneficiaries 
living  in  the  same  municipalities.  The  PRDP  program me  was  operating  in  all 
municipalities at the time of the survey (‘treatment’ municipalities). Beneficiaries were 
selected from the lists of individuals having participated in at least one projects funded by 
the PRDPs. They are normally members of grassroots organizations. Non beneficiaries 
were selected for being members of other grassroots organizations that didn’t participate 
in the PRDP initiative. This was done to try to account for endogenous selection into the 
organisations that have participated in the PRDP initiative. Comparability of grassroots 
organizations was ensured on a number of respects.  
 
At the time of data collection, the PRDP initiative had already been running for several 
years. The average length of exposure to the programme amongst sampled beneficiaries 
is 18 months, but there is a great deal variability, both within and across municipalities. In 
fact PRDPs coverage has expanded substantially over time, both within areas where the 
programme has been traditionally operating, and due to roll-outs in new regions and 
additional municipalities. 
 
In addition to the information collected in ‘treatment’ municipalities, we also use another 
dataset containing information on a further 70 municipalities where the programme was 
not in place (‘control’ municipalities). The ‘control’ municipalities were surveyed and had 
games administered  in  order to evaluate another programme called  Familias en Accion 
(FeA).
10  Whilst FeA may have acted upon social capital, it was primarily designed to 
increase families’ investments in their children’s human capital (education and health) 
through conditional cash transfers. This information was collected in winter 2005, one 







                                                                                                                                            
report (DNP, 2009). A second phase of the study is currently undergoing, coordinated by the DNP. This 
new work draws extensively on the conceptual framework, analysis and results of the policy report.  
9 The region of Meta was excluded from the analysis, as at the time of the data collection, the PRDP had 
not started financing projects yet. 
10 See Attanasio et al. (2006) for a full description of the programme and the results of its main evaluation. 
11 We  use  the  information  of  the  second  follow-up  of  the  main  FeA  evaluation.  It  comprises  FeA 
Treatment and FeA control Locations. In the case of three municipalities where the PRDP is operational, 
we have information from both the PRDP survey, and the FeA survey. We are unable to use the latter 
because we are unable to identify the beneficiaries of the PRDPs from the FeA survey.   9 
Table 1: Structure of the Data  






Number of municipalities  67  37  104 
Number of game sessions  67  45  112 
       
Number of participants  2242  1618  3860 
Number of PRDP beneficiaries  -  700
12  700
12 
Number of non PRDP beneficiaries  2242  818
12  3060
12 
       
 
Table 1, above, shows the structure of the survey data. There are three main groups of 
participants: a) individuals in ‘treatment’ locations who are directly involved with the 
PRDPs, b) individuals in ‘treatment’ locations who are not directly involved with the 
program and have not participated in any project, c) individuals in ‘control’ municipalities 
where the programme does not operate.
 12 We will exploit this variation in treatment 
status across and within municipalities when trying to assess the effect of the PRDPs on 
social capital formation.  
 
Both  PRDP  and  FeA  evaluation  data  include  information  from  a  public  good 
experimental game that was conducted in the field to elicit behavioural information on 
social capital. The games were played in group sessions, as a part of half-day workshops 
conducted in the community. Full details of the game design are provided in the next 
section. 
 
A survey was applied to all game participants, containing a detailed set of demographic 
and socio-economic information at the individual and household level. In the case of the 
PRDP dataset, the survey covers a number of potential outcomes of the programme 
relating to poverty, violence, social capital, conflict management and the relationship with 
public  institutions.  We  are  also  able  to  merge  this  information  with  additional 
municipality  level  data,  including  indicators  of  violence,  institutional  and  economic 
development. 
 
                                                 
12 When we compare treatment and control participants within treatment locations we restrict our analysis 
to 1518 observations. For the other 100 participants we don’t have reliable information on whether they 
were directly involved with PRDPs.   10 
After the game, information on social network was also gathered. All participants were 
asked  whether  they  were  acquainted  with,  friends  with,  or  related  to  every  other 
participant in their game session. From this we constructed a measure of the proportion 
of other participants each knew (by type of relationship) and indicators of whether they 
knew anyone at all. 
 
Because of the significant time demands of this particular data collection methodology, 
one may be concerned with non-random no response as some potential participants may 
refuse to take part in the games. For this reason a mechanism of sample replacement was 
put in place and there is no reason to believe that non response differentially affects 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ locations, or beneficiaries and non beneficiaries.  
 
 
When the games were conducted for the FeA evaluation it was not envisioned that the 
data would be used as ‘control’ municipalities for the evaluation of  the PRDPs, and 
hence these municipalities and individuals were not chosen to be comparable to the 
PRDP ones (but instead to be representative of those potentially entitled to FeA). A 
possible  concern  is  that,  because  of  the  way  the  PRDPs  target  municipalities,  our 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ locations may differ in a number of municipality characteristics, 
particularly violence levels and institutional efficiency. For this reason we used propensity 
score matching
13 to match  ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ localities using (pre-programme
14) 
municipality level  characteristics in 2002. The municipalities on the common support 
shall be used for our main analysis  when we compare across ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ 
municipalities.  
 
Figure  2,  summarises  the  distribution  of  propensity  scores.  2  ‘control’  localities  are 
dropped due to missing information, and 21 are dropped due to being off the common 
support, whilst 15 ‘treatment’ localities are also dropped. 2,249 game participants are on 





Figure 2: Propensity Scores and Common Support 
                                                 
13 We used a kernel matching technique on a comprehensive set of municipality variables. The function of 
participations includes all the municipality characteristics reported in Table 2 and 3. Full details of the first 
and second step of the matching process are available on demand from the authors.  
14 In four out of five treatment regions.    11 
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Table 2, provides descriptive statistics for key household and municipality level variables 
by ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ areas, for both the full sample and the matched sample. It 
shows that:  
  Before matching, ‘treatment’ municipalities have significantly larger populations, and, 
on average, higher altitude than ‘control’ municipalities. As expected, murder rates 
are  somewhat  higher,  whilst,  the  number  of  secondary  school  students  is  also 
significantly greater. 
  After matching and dropping those off the common support, there are no significant 
differences  between  ‘treatment’  and  ‘control’  areas  in  terms  of  municipality  level 
variables; that is our matching procedure is successful in balancing the ‘treatment’ 
and ‘control’ samples in terms of observable variables on the common support.  
  Both before and after matching, there are significant differences in the individual and 
household  characteristics  between  ‘treatment’  and  ‘control’  areas.  In  particular, 
participants  in  ‘treatment’  areas  are  less  likely  to  be  females,  are  generally  more 
educated  and  have  greater  access  to  household  amenities,  particularly,  landline 
phones and piped gas. These differences can be mainly attributed to the targeting 
criteria of FeA and PRDP. While only poor women that pass a socioeconomic means 
test are eligible to FeA, the selection criteria of PRDP projects are defined on a case 
by case basis.
15 
  Despite  these  differences,  both  ‘treatment’  and  ‘control’  municipalities  and 
participants are quite poor, with this being the case for the latter group in particular.  
  Participants seem to have more friends in the game sessions in ‘treatment’ locations. 
Indeed  this  may  reflect  an  effect  of  the  PRDP,  rather  than  a  pre-programme 
                                                 
15 In  order to maximize the comparability  of  our samples in control and  treatment locations we also 
performed an alternative matching including individual and household characteristics. Our main results 
don’t change.   12 
difference. Alternatively, this could be due to differences in the sampling methods 
across ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ locations.  
   13 













Individual/Household Characteristics           
Female  0.841  0.537***    0.837  0.525*** 
Age (years)  41.607  40.788    41.569  42.004 
Urban  0.581  0.557    0.615  0.528 
Water by pipe  0.664  0.724    0.644  0.705 
Sewage system  0.301  0.503***    0.31  0.446* 
Rubbish collection  0.355  0.477**    0.366  0.413 
Gas by pipe  0.097  0.498***    0.101  0.525*** 
Landline phones  0.083  0.247***    0.081  0.234*** 
Less than primary education  0.45  0.308***    0.445  0.307*** 
Full primary education  0.137  0.201***    0.135  0.204*** 
Some secondary education  0.143  0.16    0.151  0.156 
Full secondary or more  0.053  0.243***    0.054  0.225*** 
           
Municipality Characteristics (in 2002)           
Altitude  824.582  1265.539***    1018.624  1066.776 
Municipality development index  35.189  36.952    34.486  34.745 
Coca crops coverage  8.887  60.645*    14.091  6.978 
Murder rate (per 1000 inh.)  0.604  0.941*    0.658  0.705 
Total Population  27163.16  89856.188***    32414.22  34009.59 
Proportion Urban  0.508  0.545    0.523  0.508 
Outgoing displaced population (per 1000 inh.)  15.944  30.005    21.641  20.249 
Voting rate (local elections)  0.524  0.487    0.518  0.529 
Voting rate (presidential elections)  0.864  0.768*    0.822  0.817 
Voting majority (local election)  0.414  0.406    0.419  0.432 
Per capita public expenditure  0.312  0.308    0.307  0.311 
Per capita public investment  0.249  0.246    0.243  0.255 
Primary school students (per 1000 inh.)  161.417  149.262*    156.883  158.223 
Secondary school students (per 1000 inh.)  85.538  257.616**    87.301  76.060 
Judiciary processes started (per 1000 inh.)  13  17.483    13.771  13.116 
Judiciary processes terminated (per 1000 inh.)  12.954  18.210*    14.856  14.595 
           
Social Connections           
Proportion of Acquaintances in the session  0.156  0.127    0.149  0.139 
Proportion of Friends in the session  0.062  0.078**    0.058  0.075* 
Proportion of Family Members in the session  0.009  0.011    0.009  0.014 
           
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing standard errors that are clustered at the game session level.   14 
In Table 3 we further analyze the comparability of our groups by looking at ‘treatment’ 
and ‘control’ participants within ‘treatment’ areas. We also compare PRDP beneficiaries 
with different durations of treatment exposure, measured in the number of months a 
beneficiary has participated in the PRDP initiative, as we distinguish beneficiaries who 
fall below and above the median length of exposure. 
 
Overall beneficiaries and non beneficiaries in ‘treatment’ locations seem comparable on 
most  respects,  both  in  terms  of  individual,  household  level  and  municipality 
characteristics. The same is true for beneficiaries with different degrees of exposure to 
the PRDP. However there are some differences, the main ones being that:  
  Beneficiaries  are  more  likely  to  live  in  rural  areas  and  self  report  as  internally 
displaced by the civil conflict. 
  Beneficiaries that have been participating in the PRDP for a longer time are more 
educated, slightly wealthier and have better access to public services in their houses. 
  While beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries have no significant differences in the size 
of their social networks (amongst game participants), amongst beneficiaries, those 
that participated in the process for a longer time have on average more friends in the 
session. This  may be  a reflection  of new networks that have been  built through 
continued interaction in the PRDP activities. 
 
It should be noted that some of these differences may relate to impacts of the PRDP 
programme. For instance, if the programme were to improve social capital, individuals 
may exploit this to increase their income or to lobby local government for better services.  
   15 
Table 3: Individual, Household, Municipality and Other Summary Statistics. Within Treatment Locations. 
  Treatment Locations 




Individual/Household Characteristics           
Female  0.555  0.529    0.53  0.528 
Age (years)  41.164  39.766    38.49  41.964*** 
Urban  0.616  0.507**    0.483  0.552 
Water by pipe  0.73  0.716    0.725  0.704 
Sewage system  0.527  0.486    0.468  0.52 
Rubbish recollection  0.505  0.454    0.438  0.484 
Gas by pipe  0.517  0.493    0.497  0.484 
Phone (landline)  0.28  0.224*    0.19  0.288** 
Less than primary  0.319  0.296    0.311  0.272 
Full primary  0.192  0.21    0.239  0.160*** 
Some secondary  0.164  0.166    0.157  0.176 
Full secondary +  0.244  0.247    0.224  0.288 
Female head of the household  0.225  0.2    0.179  0.24 
Family members younger than 18  1.366  1.591**    1.584  1.6 
Displaced (self declared)  0.225  0.321**    0.336  0.3 
Months living in the neighbourhood  243.999  235.609    231.757  240.71 
Owns house  0.685  0.653    0.635  0.68 
Number of rooms  2.875  2.944    2.906  3.012 
Top distribution assets  0.142  0.119    0.096  0.160* 
Other support  0.26  0.3    0.3  0.304 
Laboratorios de Paz  -  0.417    0.403  0.444 
           
Municipality Characteristics (in 2002)           
Altitude   1275.844  1270.33    1336.304  1152.924 
Municipality development index  37.24  37.265    36.994  37.7 
Coca crops extension  53.064  68.5    48.928  104.124 
Murder rate (1000 inhabitants)  0.961  0.94    0.982  0.866 
           
Social Connections           
Proportion of Acquaintances in the session  0.13  0.123    0.123  0.124 
Proportion of Friends in the session  0.082  0.071    0.067  0.079* 
Proportion of Family Members in the session  0.011  0.012    0.012  0.011 
           
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing standard errors that are clustered at the game session level. 
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Section 3: The Public Goods Game  
 
The public goods game has been designed to elicit information regarding the degree of 
social-mindedness that participants display. We use a discrete version of the Volunteer 
Contribution Mechanism, pioneered by Marwell & Ames (1979), and extensively piloted 
in field experiments in Colombia (Cardenas, 2003). Initially, players are given a token and 
are provided with two options, either: 
 
  ‘Invest’ it in a ‘private pot’ and at the end receive 2000 pesos (about $1), and 
in addition receive 100 pesos (about 5 cents) for everyone who contributes to 
the ‘public pot’ within their game session, or; 
  ‘Invest’ it in the public pot in which case they forgo any private return and 
receive only 100 pesos for everyone contributing to the ‘public pot’.  
 
Decisions  are  made  privately  and  are  kept  confidential  from  the  rest  of  the  group, 
limiting the potential for social pressure and the enforcement of sanctions. Exactly the 
same design, guidelines, training protocol and training material where used in for the 
PRDP and the FeA evaluation, which  ensures that the experimental results are fully 
comparable from a procedural point of view. 
 
The structure of the incentives implies that the dominant strategy of this game is for 
every player to not contribute to the public pot; the payoff is always higher under this 
strategy irrespective of what the other players do. However, provided that there are at 
least 21 participants in the session, the social optimum is for all to invest in the public 
pot, as if all contribute each will receive at least 2100 versus 2000 if none contributes 
(Figure 3).  
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We interpret contributions to the public good as a measure of social capital because it 
involves forgoing a private return in order to increase the social return. This cooperative 
behaviour could be based on an altruistic set of preferences, or could demonstrate a 
belief (trust) that others are likely to cooperate and a commitment to act in a reciprocal 
manner. An alternative interpretation, is that contribution to the public good instead 
reflects a lack of understanding of the private incentives of the game (and vice versa). If 
this were the case we might expect less educated people to be more likely to contribute, 
something we shall test. 
 
In the second round of the game, participants are given the opportunity to communicate 
for 10 minutes, before taking the same decision again. Although not actively encouraged 
to interact, participants are expected to discuss how the game should be played in the 
second round. This could be used to exert ‘social pressure’ to contribute to the public 
good and coordinate on a more socially efficient outcome. The result of the first round 
of the game is not known when discussions take place, and decisions remain confidential 
in the final round. Hence the social pressure must act through ‘intrinsic’ channels (e.g. 
feelings of obligation, duty or guilt) for the majority of participants.
 16 Communication 
may also modify the expectation of other players’ game strategy, pushing ‘conditional 
cooperators’  towards either the social optimum or the Nash equilibrium (Fischbacher et 
al., 2001; Gächter & Thöni, 2005).  
 
 
In  Table  4  we  report  a  set  of  summary  statistics  of  the  game  sessions  that  were 
undertaken in ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ municipalities. Two features are worth noting. 
First, although the reward structure was originally designed for the game to be played in 
groups of 40 people, there is some variability in the number of participants per session. 
This will have to be accounted for in the analysis.
17  Second, in ‘treatment’ localities there 
is variation across sessions in the percentage of participants who were directly involved 
with the programme. We will come back to this later. 
 
Table 5 shows the proportion contributing in each round and by the type of municipality 
and  beneficiary  status.  The  experimental  literature  has  extensively  documented  that, 
typically, the Nash equilibrium is not observed, either in the lab or in the field. Groups of 
                                                 
16 Except, perhaps for the small number of participants with close friends / family members also playing 
who may be able to tell if they are lying (e.g. through observing subsequent behaviour and spending.) 
17 In every case sessions had less than 20 participants, the structure of incentives was redefined in such a 
way that the social optimum would offset the Nash equilibrium if more than 10 players contributed to the 
public pot.   18 
individuals seem to be able to internalize at least in part the externality built in the game. 
Contribution rates are remarkably high in ‘treatment’ locations.
 18 
 
Table 4: Session Summary Statistics 






Number of game sessions  67  45  112 
Average session size  33.46  35.96  34.46 
Minimum session size  11  21  11 
Maximum session size   40  40  40 
Average proportion of women in session  0.88  0.54  0.74 
Average proportion of beneficiaries in session  0  0.45  0.18 
Min  proportion of beneficiaries in session  0  0.24  0 
Max proportion of beneficiaries in session  0  0.67  0.67 
 
 
Table 5: Contribution to the Public Good 
Group  First Round  Second Round 
Treatment Locations (A)  63.5%  74.4% 
    Beneficiaries (E)  62.1%  73.3% 
    Non Beneficiaries (F)  64.3%  74.7% 
      
Control Locations (B)  37.0%  44.8% 
     
Matched Treatment Locations (C)  61.3%  73.8% 
Matched Control Locations (D)  36.7%  42.4% 
     
Difference A- B  26.5  29.6 
  (4.0)  (4.7) 
Difference C-D  24.6  31.4 
  (4.8)  (6.1) 
Difference E-F  -2.2  -1.4 
  (3.9)  (4.4) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. All inferences are performed computing standard errors that are clustered at the 
game session level. 
 
                                                 
18 Many  of  VCM  reported  in  the  literature  afford  the  possibility  of  investing  a  fraction  of  the  initial 
endowment, while our game forces a 0/1 choice, making the explanation much simpler. In the literature 
average contributions to the public good are in a range of forty to sixty percent of the group optimum. For 
a detail survey of these results see Camerer & Fehr (2003), Ledyard (1995), Croson (2007) and Cardenas & 
Carpenter (2008).   19 
In  the  first  instance,  comparison  between  the  ‘treatment’  and  ‘control’  areas  would 
suggest that PRDPs are associated with greater ‘social capital’. Furthermore, the very 
small  differences  between  beneficiaries  and  non-beneficiaries  in  the  ‘treatment’  areas 
would suggest that this operates at the level of the municipality rather than the individual, 
possibly because the effect of the PRDP spills over to affect even individuals that are not 
directly involved with the programme. In order to validate this hypothesis we need to 
look more closely at the data and attempt to rule out other alternative explanations: 
differences between ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ areas, or errors in interpreting contribution 
as social capital. We do this in the next section.  
 
 
Section 4: An Analysis of Desarrollo y Paz 
 
4.1 Empirical Methodology  
 
In this section, we analyse the determinants of contribution to the public good and use a 
series of regressions to assess the impact of the PRDPs upon our measure of ‘social 
capital’.  This  is  more  difficult  than  it  sounds  both  because  of  the  potential  for  the 
programme to act at different levels (the individual, the household, a specific social group 
or the municipality) and potential endogenous selection into the programme (again at 
both the individual and municipality level). Here we discuss our attempts to tackle these 
issues. It should be noted at the outset that the methodology we use to identify the 
programme’s impacts is obviously affected by the institutional setting and the available 
data. Alternative methodologies such as difference in difference were not available to us 
because of the lack of individual pre-programme data. Furthermore, there is no obvious 
candidate for an ‘instrumental variable’. This means that the results only hold conditional 
on the untestable identification assumptions we make. However, to pre-empt our results, 
we believe they should be seen as persuasive and strongly indicative of a positive effect 
of the programme on social capital.  
 
Initially we confine our analysis to those municipalities where the PRDPs are active (the 
‘treatment’ locations) and look at the differences in behaviour between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries,  controlling  for  a  set  of  observable  characteristics.  This  is  the 
appropriate comparison to make if the programme operates at the level of the individual 
beneficiary. However, if the programme affects not only those directly participating in it, 
but  improves  the  levels  of  social  capital  in  the  whole  municipality,  this  method  of 
assessing the impact may understate the impact because those ‘non-beneficiaries’ used as 
the control group actually receive (at least some) treatment too. Hence, we then compare 
areas where a PRDP is active to areas where it is not (the ‘control’ locations), again   20 
controlling  for  a  set  of  observable  differences  in  (municipality  and  individual) 
characteristics.  
 
In order to interpret the results of these first specifications causally, identification relies 
upon  any  unobserved  heterogeneity  being  orthogonal  with  respect  to  whether  an 
individual is a direct beneficiary of the programme and whether they live in a ‘treatment’ 
area. In order to avoid our conclusions depending fully on this strong assumption we 
then move on to several complementary models.   
 
It  is  plausible  that  the  effect  of  the  programme  increases  with  the  length  of  time 
someone has participated in the programme: this is the duration effect. As mentioned 
above, our sample presents some variability in the length of exposure to the PRDPs 
amongst beneficiaries, both across and within ‘treatment’ municipalities. We evaluate the 
PRDP initiative by comparing the contributions to the public good of beneficiaries with 
only brief participation in the programme with those who have participated for longer. 
Of course, this pre-supposes that, if the programme has a positive impact on social 
capital, this grows over time. Whilst the length of time an individual/a municipality has 
been exposed to the PRDP may be endogenous (perhaps those most in need of the 
programme were enrolled or self selected into the programme first), it seems plausible 
that  the  selection  bias  is  smaller  than  when  comparing  beneficiaries  and  non-
beneficiaries, as here we restrict our analysis to beneficiaries only.
19 
 
One of the potential contributions of our study is to  investigate the existence of local 
spill-over effects in social capital formation. Our approach to this issue is twofold. First, 
we study whether non-beneficiaries in  ‘treatment’ locations show different patterns of 
contribution to the public good if they have heard about the PRDP initiative. Here we 
assume that individuals with more information about the programme are also more likely 
to be exposed to its contamination effects, if there is any. Of course, knowledge of the 
PRPDs  and  game  behaviour  may  be  simultaneously  influenced  by  some  other 
unobserved factor (for instance access to social networks), therefore causality is difficult 
to address.   
 
Second,  we  investigate  the  presence  of  spill-overs  by  calculating  the  proportion  of 
beneficiaries in every game session and including this as a regressor.  Whilst it is possible 
for social capital to be a pure public good (i.e. the inclusion of one individual in the 
programme increases everyone’s social capital in the municipality) it seems more likely 
that spill-overs are incomplete and increase as a greater proportion of people participate 
                                                 
19 We have already shown (Table 3) that, at least on the basis of observables, beneficiaries are rather 
homogeneous amongst themselves.   21 
in the programme: this is the ‘critical mass’ effect (Moresi and Salop, 2003). This effect 
may operate at the population level (where the programme has a greater impact the 
higher the fraction of population participating in a particular area), or at the ‘specific 
group  level’  (where  the  fraction  of  beneficiaries  in  a  particular  context,  e.g.  a  game 
session, is the driving force). We have found that the proportion of beneficiaries in the 
game session is unrelated to the proportion in the population at large and can therefore 
distinguish between these two effects.
 20 
 
We exploit the variability in the proportion of beneficiaries that participated in each game 
session in ‘treatment’ areas. If this variability is random, the results of this model are 
potentially key to the investigation of the impact of different programme ‘intensity’ at the 
game session level. 
 
An  important  concern  in  this  work  is  the  potential  endogeneity  of  certain  potential 
explanatory variables. These include those variables relating to trust, civic engagement, 
levels of unrest, migration and economic development. On the one hand, the PRPDs 
were implemented in poor, violent and fragile communities, but the programmes may 
have subsequently improved these outcomes. Hence, including such variables will tend to 
downwardly bias estimates of programme effect. On the other hand, if these variables are 
exogenous, but differ between ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups, excluding them will lead to 
biased estimates of the programme effect. We overcome this problem using a number of 
steps. First, we base our models on a set of municipality level variables that represent 
pre-programme  information  for  4  PRDPs  out  of  5  (the  exception  being  Magdalena 
Medio). Second, we restrict the main set of household level socioeconomic controls to 
structural variables that we can confidently argue can not be directly affected by the 
Programme. Third, for a remaining set of controls, including those that are potentially 
endogenous, all analyses are conducted twice: once including these variables, and then 
excluding them. 
 
We also include in our models a set of game session level controls. They cover session 
characteristics that may directly affect individual behaviour in the first and second round: 
the size of the session, group composition in terms of age, sex and education, players’ 
heterogeneity along the same criteria, and different measures of social connectivity in the 
group. 
 
Despite the comprehensive investigation we conduct, some readers may be unpersuaded 
by our ‘identification strategy’. We would argue that at a minimum, the results should be 
seen as persuasive and consistent with the causal effect that we suggest is likely to be 
                                                 
20 Note, however, that the data on the fraction of the population of treatment municipalities participating 
has significant measurement error.    22 
occurring.  We  believe  that  in  the  absence  of  a  difference-in-difference  setting  or  a 
suitable  instrument,  it  would  be  unwise  to  simply  dismiss  the  results  obtained  here, 
imperfect as the evaluation strategy is. A number of robustness checks are carried out 
and results all point towards the same direction.  
 
 
4.2 Investigating Individual and Municipality PRDP Effects 
 
4.2.1 Using Non Beneficiaries as Controls 
 
Table 6 shows the results from the regression of contribution to the public good in the 
first  round  on  individual  and  household  characteristics  within  treated  municipalities 
surveyed  as  part  of  the  main  PRDP  evaluation.  The  first  column  (Specification  I) 
includes only those control variables relating to individual, household and municipality 
level characteristics,  the  second  column  (Specification  II)  also  includes  variables  that 
capture characteristics of the game session, whilst other potentially endogenous variables 
are added in the third column (Specification III). We only report the coefficients on the 
main variables; the complete set of results is shown in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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The first point to note is that in all specifications beneficiaries of the PRDPs are no more 
likely to contribute to the public good than non beneficiaries and, indeed, the effect is 
negative in sign (although very small in magnitude). Players with some education are 
more  likely  to  contribute  than  those  with  no  education,  and  the  average  level  of 
education amongst game participants in the session also has a positive and significant 
coefficient.  These  results  go  someway  to  counteracting  the  worry  that  contribution 
reflects  a  misunderstanding  of  individual  incentives  rather  than  pro-social  behaviour. 
Perhaps surprisingly,  the number of players in  the game  does not have a significant 
impact on game play, nor does the proportion of acquaintances or friends. The presence 
of a greater number of family members reduces the probability of contributing to the 
public good.  
 
Table  A1  in  the  Appendix  shows  additional  variables,  some  of  which  do  have  a 
significant impact on contribution, namely: the older one is the greater the likelihood of 
contribution to the public good, those with access to water by pipe (which may proxy 
deprivation  level)  are  more  likely  to  contribute,  members  of  households  with  more 
children  are  more  cooperative  and  internally  displaced  people  are  generally  less. 
Municipality level variables have no significant nor strong effects on players’ behaviour in 
                                                 
21 The set of control variables at the individual, household and session level is larger for the models that 
only involve data from treatment municipalities, as the PRDP dataset is richer.    23 
the game. In terms of the potentially endogenous regressors, those with higher levels of 
income are possibly more likely to cooperate and those who state a general belief in the 
trustworthiness of others are also more likely to contribute to the public good. Whilst 
inclusion of game session-level variables and likely endogenous regressors changes the 
coefficients slightly, the qualitative findings are unaffected.   
 
Table 7 shows the results of the same analysis for the second round of the game. Here 
we include as an additional regressor behaviour in the first round so that coefficients 
measure the effect of a variable on second round behaviour, conditional on its impact in 
the first round.
22 Again there is no impact of participati ng in the PRDP initiative on 
individual decisions to contribute   to the public good . Controlling for first round 
behaviour, both education and social connection variables also have very little power in 
explaining behaviour in the   game. Of the other variables (T able A2),  females are 
significantly more likely to  contribute in the second round, and  higher proportion of 
women in the game session is also found to increase the probability of contribution in 
the  second  round .  This  suggests  that  women  may  be  better  able  to  encourage 
contribution during the between-round discussion and that they are more susceptible to 
the social/moral pressure brought to bear.  The murder rate in the municipality is also 
found to increase the likelihood of contribution in the second round.   Potentially 
endogenous  variables  like  income  or  standard  measures  of  trust  don’t  show  any 











                                                 
22 Given that we control for first round behaviour, one should not interpret the coefficient on PRDP as the 
total effect of participation in a PRDP on second round decisions. For instance, in a situation where 
communication between rounds has no effects at all, and every player sticks to the strategy of the first 
round, the first round decision would be the only relevant determinant of second round behaviour, and all 
other coefficients would be zero (including that on the PRDP indicator). Instead, the coefficient on PRDP 
in the second round should be interpreted as the ‘additional’ impact of the programme on behaviour in the 
second round, conditional on its impact in the first round. The total effect can be calculated as the effect in 
the first round multiplied by the correlation between first and second round behaviours, plus the net effect 
measured  here.  During  our  work  we  have  used  an  additional  set  of  specifications  where  we  avoid 
controlling for first round behaviour. The results are overall largely consistent with those shown in the 
main text and are available from the authors on request.  
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Table 6 – First Round Contributions (PRDP Municipalities Only) 
Variable  Specification I  Specification II  Specification III 
Treatment  -0.004  -0.003  -0.012 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
       
Some Primary  0.112*  0.131**  0.136** 
  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.060) 
Complete Primary  0.096  0.113*  0.114* 
  (0.068)  (0.065)  (0.066) 
Some Secondary  0.122**  0.114**  0.114** 
  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.057) 
Full Secondary  0.170***  0.167**  0.147** 
  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.067) 
Session Size    -0.005  -0.006 
    (0.005)  (0.004) 
Prop. Family    -0.717  -0.774* 
    (0.478)  (0.462) 
Prop. Acquaint      0.035 
      (0.167) 
Prop.  Friend      0.027 
      (0.201) 
       
N  1485  1485  1485 
       
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 
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Table 7 – 2nd Round Contributions (PRDP Municipalities Only) 
Variable  Specification I  Specification II  Specification III 
Treatment  0.030  0.023  0.022 
  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
First Round Behaviour   0.296***  0.293***  0.293*** 
  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
       
Some Primary  -0.011  -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.039) 
Complete Primary  0.044  0.043  0.043 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Some Secondary  0.023  0.026  0.027 
  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Full Secondary  -0.016  -0.010  -0.010 
  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.058) 
Session Size    0.002  0.002 
    (0.006)  (0.006) 
Prop. Family    -0.091  -0.124 
    (0.402)  (0.410) 
Prop. Acquaint       -0.022 
      (0.192) 
Prop.  Friend       -0.042 
      (0.257) 
       
N  1485  1485  1485 
       
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 
standard errors that are clustered at the game session level. Marginal Probit specification. 
 
4.2.2 Using Familias en Accion Sample as Controls  
 
If the PRDPs have wider impacts beyond that on direct programme beneficiaries, using 
non-beneficiaries from municipalities where the programme is active as controls would 
not be an appropriate evaluation strategy. The programme may operate at the level of the 
municipality due to spillovers between friends and acquaintances, for instance. Indeed, 
the idea of the program is to improve the social environment of the municipalities where 
it operates. If these effects are important, one should compare the behaviour in ‘treated’ 
communities to that of individuals from other municipalities where the programme is not 
active. The FeA sample allows this municipality level analysis to take place.  
 
In  Section  2.3  we  showed  that  whilst  the  composition  of  the  ‘control’  areas  differs 
somewhat (in particular, PRDP areas tend  to have  better infrastructure  – e.g. water, 
sewage, telephone systems– than FeA areas, and players sampled from PRDP areas are 
less  likely  to  be  women  and  are  more  educated,  on  average),  it  does  not  differ  in   26 
important ways in  terms of the  observed characteristics that matter  for contribution 
choice.  Particularly  when  we  impose  common  support,  municipality  observable 
characteristics  are  sufficiently  similar  to  combine  the  two  samples  and  to  use  FeA 
municipalities  as  a  control.  However,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  unobserved 
characteristics may differ significantly between areas. We present further results in the 
next  sub-section  designed  to  assuage  worries  that  it  is  simply  these  unobserved 
differences driving our results.   
 
Table 8 shows results of this comparison across municipalities for the first round. Our 
models include a set of individual, household, municipality and session composition level 
variables  that  are  common  across  the  two  surveys.  We  present  separately  results 
depending on whether or not we impose common support.  
 
The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating that a participant lives in a ‘treatment’ 
area is fairly large and significant in all tested specifications; in particular, the effect is 
robust to imposing common support and to the inclusion (and exclusion) of session-level 
regressors.  According  to  our  most  conservative  estimate,  ceteris  paribus,  the  PRDP 
contributes  to  an  increase  in  the  probability  to  contribute  to  the  public  good  in 
‘treatment’ areas of 15 percentage points.  
 
Of the other variables, the same continue to be significant: age, where older participants 
are more likely to contribute; the variable recording access to piped water; and session 
size. As in results presented in Table 6 the probability of contribution is still highest for 
those  with  the  highest  levels  of  education,  again  soothing  worries  about  the 
interpretation of contribution as ‘social capital’ rather than an inability to understand 
game incentives.  This positive influence of education operates in two ways. On the one 
hand more educated individuals are more cooperative in the game, on the other hand 
players are more inclined to contribute to the public investment pot when the other 
game participants also show higher education levels.  
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Table 8: Comparing Treatment with Control Areas, Round 1 






Treatment Muni  0.256***  0.150*  0.221***  0.184* 
  (0.059)  (0.083)  (0.071)  (0.102) 
         
Some Primary  0.061*  0.061*  0.037  0.034 
  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
Complete Primary  0.038  0.033  -0.006  -0.016 
  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Some Secondary  0.087**  0.068**  0.030  0.013 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
Full Secondary+  0.116***  0.088**  0.074  0.062 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.051)  (0.053) 
Session Size    0.006*    0.006 
    (0.004)    (0.005) 
Prop. Family    -0.038    -0.377 
    (0.463)    (0.411) 
         
N  3674  3670  2170  2166 
         
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 
standard errors that are clustered at the game session level. Marginal Probit specification. 
 
The analysis of second-round behaviour in Table 9 confirms that those who contributed 
in the first round are very much more likely to contribute in the second round. However, 
even after controlling for first round behaviour, participants living in PRDP ‘treatment’ 
areas are still significantly more likely to contribute to the public good than those living 
in ‘control’ areas. The magnitude of this effect is economically important, as according to 
our most conservative specification we estimate a positive effect on the probability to 
contribute to the public good of 29 percentage points.  
 
Education is no longer a significant determinant of the likeliness of contribution whilst 
the number of players in the game is: more players leads to more contribution, possibly 
because the social optimum more starkly Pareto dominates the Nash equilibrium. The 
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Table 9: Comparing Treatment with Control Areas, Round 2 






Treatment Muni  0.332***  0.305***  0.313***  0.288*** 
  (0.065)  (0.099)  (0.075)  (0.110) 
First Round 
Behaviour  0.391***  0.381***  0.454***  0.449*** 
  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.043)  (0.039) 
         
Some Primary  -0.032  -0.025  0.019  0.020 
  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
Complete Primary  0.003  0.007  0.058  0.043 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.044) 
Some Secondary  -0.009  -0.015  0.032  0.011 
  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.046)  (0.044) 
Full Secondary+  -0.022  -0.031  -0.008  -0.010 
  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.053)  (0.050) 
Session Size    0.014***    0.016*** 
    (0.004)    (0.005) 
Prop. Family    0.080    0.656 
    (0.419)    (0.455) 
         
N  3674  3670  2170  2166 
         
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 
standard errors that are clustered at the game session level. Marginal Probit specification. 
 
4.3 Additional Analysis of the PRDPs 
 
Section 4.2 has two clear findings, although there are concerns regarding endogeneity and 
selection: 
 
1.  Direct beneficiaries are no more likely to contribute to the public good than non-
beneficiaries living in treatment municipalities.  
 
2.  Individuals living in treatment municipalities are much more likely to contribute 
than those living in control municipalities.  
 
The latter finding would suggest the PRDPs have large spill-over effects, increasing the 
degree of social capital for the entire community, but this could be driven purely by 
endogenous selection of municipalities into the programme. Even taken at face value, the 
results suggest little about the way the programme affects social capital. In this section 
we use variation in programme duration and intensity to conduct further analysis that   29 
sheds some light on the way the programme is likely to operate and that should assuage 
worries regarding the endogeneity of treatment status.  
 
4.3.1 Length of Programme Participation 
 
Section 4.2.1 would shows that contribution to the public good is no greater for direct 
beneficiaries  of  the  PRDP  programmes  than  non-beneficiaries  living  in  treatment 
municipalities. This failure to find a positive effect of participation in PRDP may be due 
to spill over effects on non-beneficiaries, as discussed in Section 4.1 and 4.2.2, or because 
of endogenous selection into the programme. For instance, those targeted by programme 
administrators may have been those worst affected by civil unrest and breakdown and 
may have had lower initial levels of social capital. The methodology of Section 4.2.1 




Here we make use of the fact that there is variation both across individuals and 
municipalities in the length of time participants have  benefitting from a PRDP projects. 
This performs two roles. First, and most obviously, it allows us to test if the impact of 
the programme changes as time of exposure increases. Second, conditional on this, and 
provided we are willing to assume that length of exposure t o the programme is 
orthogonal with respect to unobserved characteristics, we can use this to supplement our 
views of the overall programme impact.  
 
Table 10, below, shows that those participating in the programme for 15 or more months 
are more likely to c ontribute to the public pot than those participating for  6 or fewer 
months. When we use dummies for at least 7, 10 and 14 months of exposure, a similar 
result  emerges.  However  after  controlling  for  composition  effects  and  potentially 
endogenous regressors, the size of the effect decreases and it is no longer significant.









                                                 
23 It is not necessarily the case that the bias must be negative, however. If individuals endogenously select in 
to the programme (rather than the programme selecting them), one would expect individuals with greater 
civic engagement and greater levels of social capital to sign up (leading to an upward bias in results).  
24 When individual exposure time is included as a regressor  in a linear fashion, we find a positive but 
statistically insignificant effect.   30 
Table 10 – Effect of Individual Exposure – First Round (PRDP Beneficiaries Only) 
Variable  Specification I  Specification II  Specification III 
7-14 Months Treatment  0.045  0.010  0.019 
  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
> 14 Months Treatment  0.085**  0.064  0.060 
  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
       
Some Primary  0.163  0.150  0.173* 
  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.103) 
Complete Primary  0.123  0.134  0.139 
  (0.113)  (0.112)  (0.114) 
Some Secondary  0.107  0.070  0.087 
  (0.110)  (0.109)  (0.109) 
Full Secondary+  0.213**  0.183*  0.152 
  (0.105)  (0.104)  (0.109) 
Session Size    0.004  0.003 
    (0.006)  (0.006) 
Prop. Family    -1.672***  -1.646*** 
    (0.435)  (0.468) 
Prop. Acquaint      -0.111 
      (0.245) 
Prop.  Friend       0.246 
      (0.308) 
       
N  684  684  684 
       
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 
standard errors that are clustered at the game session level. Marginal Probit specification. 
 
In  order  to  fully  avoid  potential  biases  arising  from  the  self-selection  of  individual 
beneficiaries into the programme we also calculate the maximum exposure to PRDPs in 
every municipality. This gives us an estimate of the time since the PRDP initiative started 
in a given location. We find positive and significant impacts of this municipality level 
indicator of exposure on beneficiaries’ contribution to the public good, but not on non 
beneficiaries’ (Table 11).  
 
Together, these results indicate a positive impact of participation in the PRPDs that 
increases over time. They suggest that the process triggered by the PRDPs requires time 
to generate effects on social capital, as it involves complex changes in attitudes. Also, the 
analysis  of  maximum  exposure  in  treated  municipalities  suggests  that  the  effects 
propagate  beyond  direct  beneficiaries,  as  participants  may  start  gaining  from  the 
intervention even before they start participating in a project themselves.  
   31 
Looking to the second round, there is no additional impact of the duration of exposure 
to the programme on contributions. 
 
 
Table 11 – Effect of Municipality Exposure – First Round (PRDP Beneficiaries Only) 
Variable  Specification I  Specification II  Specification III 
Months of Exposure 
(Municipality Max)  0.003**  0.002*  0.002* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Months of Exposure 
(Individual)  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
Some Primary  0.178*  0.157  0.183* 
  (0.097)  (0.101)  (0.103) 
Complete Primary  0.132  0.135  0.144 
  (0.111)  (0.114)  (0.115) 
Some Secondary  0.119  0.076  0.097 
  (0.106)  (0.109)  (0.108) 
Full Secondary+  0.222**  0.184*  0.157 
  (0.104)  (0.105)  (0.109) 
Session Size     0.005  0.004 
     (0.005)  (0.005) 
Prop. Family     -1.456***  -1.391*** 
     (0.460)  (0.493) 
Prop. Acquaint       -0.210 
       (0.241) 
Prop.  Friend        0.220 
       (0.315) 
       
N  684  684  684 
       
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 




4.3.2 Effect of Programme Awareness 
 
As part of the survey accompanying the games, all participants in treated areas (both 
beneficiaries and non beneficiaries) were asked whether they had heard of the PRDP 
initiative and whether they knew any of its activities or projects. Not surprisingly almost   32 
all  the  beneficiaries  knew  the  programme,
25  whereas  approximately  60%  of  non 
beneficiaries were aware of it. 
 
In this section we investigate whether knowledge of the PRDP initiative affe cts game 
behaviour  in  order  to  explore  how  the  programme  impacts  non-beneficiaries  in 
‘treatment’ areas. Table 12 shows the estimates of the effect of having heard of the 
PRDP initiative on the contribution to the public good. The specification used is the 
same as in Section 4.2.1, except that we now include a dummy for both treatment status 
and PRDP knowledge status. 
 
Table 12 – First Round Contributions (PRDP Municipalities Only) 
Variable  Specification I  Specification II  Specification III 
Treatment  -0.040  -0.043  -0.052 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
Knows the PRPD  0.089**  0.102***  0.105*** 
  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
       
Some Primary  0.108*  0.125**  0.130** 
  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.060) 
Complete Primary  0.089  0.104  0.102 
  (0.070)  (0.068)  (0.069) 
Some Secondary  0.111*  0.104*  0.102* 
  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.058) 
Full Secondary+  0.161**  0.155**  0.136** 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.068) 
Session Size    -0.006  -0.007* 
    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Prop. Family    -0.965**  -1.031** 
    (0.471)  (0.458) 
Prop. Acquaint      0.084 
      (0.176) 
Prop.  Friend       -0.037 
      (0.202) 
       
N  1472  1472  1472 
       
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 
standard errors that are clustered at the game session level. Marginal Probit specification. 
 
The results suggest that knowledge of the PRDP initiative has a positive and significant 
effect on the contribution to the public good in the first round of the game, but not in 
the second. When looking at non-beneficiaries only, we estimate that having heard of 
                                                 
25 Only 1 percent of the sample of beneficiaries do not know the programme. This is possibly due to the 
fact that the PRDP initiative might be known locally with different names.   33 
the PRDP is associated with an increase in the probability to invest in the public pot of 
between 8 and 9 percentage points. 
 
Interpreting this result is not straightforward. It seems reasonable to presume that non 
beneficiaries who know the programme have stronger ties with PRDP beneficiaries, and 
are therefore more likely to reflect any contamination effect that propagates from the 
programme through existing social networks.  One interpretation is that their greater 
propensity to contribute is an evidence of the existence of spill-over effects in social 
capital  formation.  However  their  wider  social  networks  (and  better  institutional 
connections) may be correlated with a set of innate social preferences and characteristics 
that directly explain their behaviour in the game.  
 
Whilst the evidence presented in this section does not demonstrate causality, it is in line 
with our hypothesis that there are spillovers at the municipality level, and that these may 
act through channels of formal and informal social networks.  
 
4.3.3 Using the proportion of beneficiaries as a regressor  
 
In  order  to  further  investigate  the  nature  of  the  impact  of  PRDP  on  public  goods 
contributions  as  measured  in  the  experimental  game,  we  now  present  a  series  of 
regressions  that  include  the  proportion  of  beneficiaries  in  the  game  session  (for 
‘treatment’ areas only). This will allow investigation of how the programme works in 
increasing ‘social capital’ as measured by the public goods game assessing: (a) whether it 
is purely a municipality level phenomenon; (b) whether it depends upon the number of 
beneficiaries  in  the  municipality,  or;  (c)  whether  it  depends  upon  the  number  of 
beneficiaries in a specific context (e.g. the game session). It also offers a method of 
overcoming the potential endogenous selection of areas into the PRDP initiative. 
 
It  was  originally  planned  that  in  ‘treatment’ areas  50%  of  game  participants  in  each 
session  would  be  PRDP  beneficiaries.  Whilst  on  average  an  almost  equal  split  was 
achieved,  there  is  significant  variation  in  the  proportion  of  beneficiaries  across 
‘treatment’ municipalities (see Table 4). We have already argued that this variation is not 
correlated  with  the  real  variation  in  municipality  programme  coverage  over  the  total 
population.  This  unplanned  variation  has  turned  out  to  be  fortuitous  allowing  an 
additional method with which one can attempt to identify the mechanisms of social 
capital formation. In particular, if the proportion of beneficiaries in the game is found to 
be a significant determinant of behaviour, we have support for hypothesis (c), above.  
   34 
As Table 13 and 14 show, for both the first and the second round of the game, the 
coefficient on the proportion of beneficiaries is quite large and significant, even when 
one includes session-level characteristics and potentially endogenous regressors. Other 
variables have coefficients similar to those in Tables 6 and 7 for the first and second 
rounds respectively.  
 
Table 13: Including the Proportion of Beneficiaries (Round 1) 
Variable  Specification I  Specification II  Specification III 
Beneficiary  -0.013  -0.006  -0.014 
  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
Beneficiary Proportion  0.484***  0.550***  0.546*** 
  (0.177)  (0.147)  (0.154) 
       
Some Primary  0.111*  0.130**  0.135** 
  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.060) 
Complete Primary  0.092  0.112*  0.111* 
  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.067) 
Some Secondary  0.105*  0.098  0.097 
  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.060) 
Full Secondary+  0.166**  0.161**  0.141** 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.068) 
Session Size    -0.008*  -0.008* 
    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Prop. Family    -0.802*  -0.865** 
    (0.447)  (0.435) 
Prop. Acquaint       0.067 
      (0.168) 
Prop.  Friend       -0.063 
      (0.211) 
       
N  1485  1485  1485 
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 
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Table 14: Including the Proportion of Beneficiaries (Round 2) 
Variable  Specification I  Specification II  Specification III 
Beneficiary  0.022  0.019  0.018 
  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Beneficiary Proportion  0.346*  0.365*  0.386** 
  (0.200)  (0.189)  (0.180) 
       
First Round Behaviour  0.289***  0.287***  0.288*** 
  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
       
Complete Primary  -0.012  -0.005  -0.006 
  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.039) 
Some Secondary  0.043  0.041  0.040 
  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Full Secondary+  0.013  0.014  0.014 
  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.049) 
Session Size    -0.000  -0.001 
    (0.005)  (0.006) 
Prop. Family    -0.151  -0.191 
    (0.419)  (0.427) 
Prop. Acquaint      -0.000 
      (0.185) 
Prop.  Friend       -0.109 
      (0.253) 
       
N  1485  1485  1485 
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 
standard errors that are clustered at the game session level. Marginal Probit specification. 
 
 
The estimates indicate that increasing the proportion of beneficiaries in the game session 
from 40 to 60 % of the total number of players determines a rise in contribution to the 
public good of about 9.1 percentage points in the first round and 6.2 percentage points 
in  the  second.
26 This suggests  that the  proportion of beneficiaries has a  remarkably 
significant and positive impact on probability of contribution to the public pot in both 
the first and second rounds of the game.
27  
 
Why might the proportion of beneficiaries in the game session matter for behaviour?   
There are several possibilities. One possibility is that those sessions where the proportion 
                                                 
26 Holding all other variables fixed at their mean value. 
27 As  a  robustness  check  of  this  result  we  split  the  sample  up  into  sub-samples  along  three different 
dimensions (education, sex and family income) into eight subgroups. For each two rounds of game 12 out 
of 12 regressions have positive coefficients on the variable recording proportion of beneficiaries (even if 
insignificant at standard levels of significance due to the smaller sample sizes). Breaking down the results 
also shows that the proportion of beneficiaries does not have a uniform impact across the sample.   36 
of beneficiaries is higher are likely to have a greater degree of social connectedness, 
which  may  make  people  more  likely  to  contribute  to  the  game.  In  fact,  PRDP 
beneficiaries may know each other in a given municipality.
 28 This would go in favour of 
the idea that the PRDPs are producing some sort of bonding social capital (Narayan, 
1999). 
 
We reject this hypothesis on the ground of additional evidence. In Specification III we 
include  the  proportion  of  friends  and  acquaintances  in  the  session  as  explanatory 
variables of individual game decisions. This doesn’t change our estimates substantially. 
Furthermore, we find that the degree of connectedness of a session, measured by the 




Finally, if  it is  stronger social  bonds  that drive  the result, the  impact of beneficiary 
proportion should be greater for beneficiaries  than for non beneficiaries.  We interact 
treatment status and the proportion of bene ficiaries to further examine this  case. We 
don’t find any significant effect of the interacted term in Round 1. However, in Round 2 
we  find  that  the  effect of  the  interaction  is  opposite  to  what  we  would  expect:  the 




Table 15: Including the Proportion of Beneficiaries (Round 2) 
Variable  Specification I  Specification II  Specification III 
Beneficiary  0.248*  0.265**  0.272** 
  (0.129)  (0.124)  (0.124) 
Beneficiary Proportion  0.584**  0.634**  0.664*** 
  (0.264)  (0.256)  (0.251) 
Proportion * Beneficiary   -0.518*  -0.564*  -0.582* 
  (0.314)  (0.301)  (0.302) 
       
First Round Behaviour  0.290***  0.287***  0.288*** 
  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
       
Some Primary  -0.016  -0.009  -0.010 
  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.039) 
                                                 
28 One  might  hypothesise  that  this  related  to  greater  ability  to  exert  social/moral  pressure  within  the 
context of the conversation taking place during game-play. However, as this effect is observed in the first 
round too, this cannot be the entire explanation. 
29 Additional estimations show that  the proportion of game participants  having heard of the PRDP has 
even a more positive effect on the contribution to the public good in the first round than the proportion of 
beneficiaries itself. If there is any, an eventual connectivity effect would therefore operate through more 
extended social networks that those bonding only actual beneficiaries amongst themselves.   37 
Complete Primary  0.037  0.035  0.034 
  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Some Secondary  0.004  0.003  0.003 
  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Full Secondary+  -0.028  -0.026  -0.026 
  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.058) 
Session Size    -0.001  -0.001 
    (0.005)  (0.006) 
Prop. Family    -0.168  -0.208 
    (0.397)  (0.404) 
Prop. Acquaint      -0.014 
      (0.183) 
Prop.  Friend       -0.110 
      (0.270) 
       
N  1485  1485  1485 
       
Notes: Indicators of significance: * - 10% level, ** - 5% level, *** - 1% level. All inferences are performed computing 
standard errors that are clustered at the game session level. Marginal Probit specification. 
 
 
This  leads  to  a  second  line  of  interpretation  of  the  link  between  proportion  of 
beneficiaries and players’ behaviour in the game. The key mechanism could be through 
reputation and expected behaviour. If beneficiaries are perceived to be more likely to 
contribute  to  the  public  pot,  or  alternatively  better  able  to  detect  and  punish  non-
contributors, the rate of contribution may rise as the proportion of beneficiaries in the 
game session rises.  
 
This interpretation is consistent with the theory that for some people cooperation is 
conditional on interacting with a groups of socially minded people who are also likely to 
co-operate (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Gächter & Thöni, 2005; Burlando & Guala 2005). 
Indeed,  for  this  reputation  effect  to  work  treatment  status  must  be  known  or 
recognisable to other game participants (Brosig, 2002), as may in fact be facilitated by 
communication in Round 2.  
 
Tables 6 and 7 showed that beneficiaries were no more likely to contribute to the public 
good  than  non-beneficiaries,  indicating  that  any  reputation  of  being  more  likely  to 
contribute is not borne out in actual behaviour. One might expect the beneficiaries to 
have  better  information  about  other  beneficiaries  and  to  anticipate  this.  Hence,  the 
proportion of beneficiaries would have no (or less) impact on their behaviour than non-
beneficiaries. As shown in table 14, we find evidence for this.  
   38 
We  are  not  able  to  test  the  channels  of  programme  operation  more  robustly  here. 
Whichever interpretation is valid (and it is possible that it is neither), the results of this 
section are supportive of our argument that programmes like the PRDPs need to reach a 
‘critical  mass’  of  treatment  to  enable  social  capital  formation.  In  the  specific  setting 
represented  by  the  public  good  game  sessions,  significant  improvements  to  social 
outcomes  require  a  significant  proportion  of  participants  to  have  been  subject  to 
treatment.  Together with the  impact  of the  duration of exposure  to the  programme 
(Section 4.3.1), this suggests that the intensity of the programme is of key importance.  
 
Figures  4  and  5  give  a  graphical  representation  of  this  phenomenon.  The  bivariate 
relationship between proportion of beneficiaries and individual decision to cooperate 
suggests that, particularly in Round 2, social capital accumulation is not a fully linear 
process. Rather there seems to be an enabling threshold: a critical level of treatment 
‘mass’ that should be hit in order to activate social cooperation modalities in the group.   
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Section 4.2 shows the following: 
  Controlling for observed characteristics, PRDP beneficiaries are no more likely to 
contribute to the public good than non-beneficiaries who live in ‘treatment’ areas.  
  Interpretation of contribution as a ‘lack of understanding’ finds little support: 
higher levels of education are not associated with less contribution (and indeed 
are associated with greater probability of contribution in the first round).  
  The finding of no effect when comparing beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries 
may relate to selection into the programme based on unobservables.  
  Controlling  for  observed  characteristics,  those  living  in  ‘treatment’  areas  are 
significantly more likely to contribute to the public good than non-beneficiaries 
in both rounds of the game 
  In the second round this holds even after controlling for first round behaviour 
suggesting that communication is more effective in treatment municipalities.  
 
Section 4.3 shows the following: 
  Those beneficiaries of the programme who have been exposed for longer have a 
higher rate of contribution to the public good than those who have been exposed 
for only a short time only. Similarly, in those municipalities where the PRDPs 
have a longer trajectory of work beneficiaries are more likely to contribute.   40 
  Knowledge of the programme significantly increases contribution to the public 
good, particularly in the first round of the game.  
  A higher proportion of beneficiaries increases contribution to the public good in 
both the first and second round (conditional on first round behaviour).  
  This appears to relate to expected reciprocity and reputation. 
  Taken together these results suggest that the programme impact increases with 
time and that a significant degree of coverage is important in realising its benefits.  
 
 
Section 5: Conclusions 
 
Developing social capital as a precursor to reduced conflict and improved economic 
vitality is a key priority for Colombia. This paper analyses the impact of one initiative 
targeted at this problem, Desarrollo y Paz, through a game that mimics a public goods 
provision problem. This work suggests that the programme may have a positive impact 
on social capital, at least as measured by the behaviour in a public good game. Moreover, 
this effect seems to go beyond those directly participating in the programme. In both the 
first  and  second  rounds  of  our  public  good  game,  there  is  a  significant  positive 
coefficient on the dummy variable indicating residence in an area where PRDP is in 
operation  whilst  the  dummy  variable  indicating  individual  beneficiary  status  is 
insignificant. 
 
Obviously, these results are conditional on the specific assumptions and methodology 
that  we  have  used  in  the  analysis.  In  particular,  we  assume  that,  conditional  on  the 
observable variables we consider in the analysis, our ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups are 
comparable and their behaviour in the public good game is not affected by unobservable 
variables that differ systematically between the two groups.  
 
In order to further investigate the channel though which this effect acts and to partly 
overcome concerns about endogenous selection in to the programme, three additional 
specifications are implemented. These models add the duration of exposure, knowledge 
of the programme, and the proportion of programme beneficiaries in the game session as 
explanatory variables. The most striking result is that the presence of more programme 
beneficiaries in a game session encourages contributions from others in the session; this 
could be because participants are trusted to reciprocate, or they are felt better able to 
punish non-contribution, or in second round, larger groups of participants are better able 
to exert moral/social pressure during discussions. In terms of policy implications, this 
implies that programme participation needs to be relatively high – the positive effects do 
not fully ‘trickle down’ from a few participants but rely upon a critical mass in terms of   41 
coverage  to  have  maximum  effect  on  social  outcomes.  Furthermore,  the  impact  of 
programme duration suggests that it takes time for the full impact of participation in the 
PRDPs to be felt.  
 
Our  results  come  to  support  a  growing  body  of  evidence  on  the  effectiveness  of 
participatory community based initiatives in conflict settings. For instance, Fearon et al. 
(2009)  study  the  effect  of  a  community  driven  reconstruction  programme  on  social 
cohesion in the context of the civil war in Liberia. They show results from a random field 
experiment where they use a similar version of the public good game to elicit information 
on social capital. Their findings and methodology are similar to what we present in this 
work. 
 
As has been made clear throughout, the identification strategy used in this paper is not 
perfect, although we believe it does respond well to the data limitations. Future work on 
evaluating  such  policies  would  benefit  from  randomised  allocation  of  areas  into 
treatment and control groups, and pre-programme experiments that could be used as 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  PRDP Individual Level Effect (Treatment Locations)  Effect of Knowing the PRDP (Treatment Locations) 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
                                   
Female  -0.024  -0.023  -0.011  0.061*  0.062**  0.064**  -0.020  -0.019  -0.007  0.061*  0.061*  0.062** 
  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Age (years)  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Urban  0.037  -0.029  -0.016  0.006  -0.004  -0.002  0.037  -0.028  -0.015  0.009  0.009  -0.002 
  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.041) 
Water by pipe  0.079**  0.067*  0.069*  0.015  0.019  0.021  0.071*  0.060*  0.063*  0.017  0.017  0.020 
  (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.038) 
Sewage system  -0.032  -0.026  -0.030  0.018  0.019  0.019  -0.033  -0.027  -0.031  0.015  0.015  0.016 
  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.041) 
Rubbish recollection  -0.067  -0.030  -0.034  -0.024  -0.006  -0.005  -0.063  -0.026  -0.031  -0.026  -0.026  -0.008 
  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.044) 
Gas by pipe  -0.039  -0.019  -0.022  -0.022  -0.031  -0.031  -0.036  -0.016  -0.019  -0.024  -0.024  -0.032 
  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.029) 
Phone (landline)  0.007  -0.010  -0.017  0.039  0.016  0.016  0.005  -0.013  -0.019  0.039  0.039  0.015 
  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
Less than primary  0.112*  0.131**  0.136**  -0.011  -0.004  -0.004  0.108*  0.125**  0.130**  -0.004  -0.004  0.001 
  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.040) 
Full primary  0.096  0.113*  0.114*  0.044  0.043  0.043  0.089  0.104  0.102  0.050  0.050  0.047 
  (0.068)  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.070)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Some secondary  0.122**  0.114**  0.114**  0.023  0.026  0.027  0.111*  0.104*  0.102*  0.028  0.028  0.028 
  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.048) 
Full secondary +  0.170***  0.167**  0.147**  -0.016  -0.010  -0.010  0.161**  0.155**  0.136**  -0.011  -0.011  -0.009 
  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.067)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.068)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.057) 
Female head of the household  -0.036  -0.037  -0.033  0.004  0.005  0.006  -0.040  -0.041  -0.036  0.004  0.004  0.005 
  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Family members younger than 18  0.018**  0.020**  0.021**  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  0.018**  0.020**  0.021**  -0.007  -0.007  -0.008 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Displaced (self declared)  -0.082**  -0.091**  -0.087**  -0.025  -0.026  -0.024  -0.086**  -0.094**  -0.089**  -0.026  -0.026  -0.027 
  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.033)   45 
Months living in the neighborhood  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Owns house  -0.004  -0.002  -0.000  -0.029  -0.021  -0.021  -0.000  0.001  0.004  -0.026  -0.026  -0.018 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Number of rooms  0.010  0.012  0.008  0.006  0.007  0.008  0.009  0.011  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.008 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Top distribution assets  0.001  0.004  -0.025  0.018  0.018  0.020  -0.008  -0.004  -0.033  0.017  0.017  0.018 
  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Laboratorios de Paz  -0.020  -0.033  -0.039  -0.087  -0.084  -0.085  -0.017  -0.029  -0.037  -0.089  -0.089  -0.083 
  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.062)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.067) 
Other support  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.036  0.035  0.035  0.047  0.045  0.045  0.033  0.033  0.033 
  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Altitude   -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Municipality development index  0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  -0.003  -0.002  -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Coca crops extension  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000*  0.000*  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Murder rate (per 1000 inh.)  0.018  -0.001  -0.002  0.045**  0.048**  0.048**  0.021  -0.000  -0.002  0.045**  0.045**  0.048** 
  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.020) 
Region Maciso Colombiano  0.070  0.038  0.046  0.087  0.160**  0.155**  0.081  0.047  0.057  0.085  0.085  0.158** 
  (0.069)  (0.084)  (0.082)  (0.075)  (0.071)  (0.076)  (0.066)  (0.078)  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.071) 
Region Magdalena Medio  -0.154**  -0.215**  -0.212**  0.038  0.040  0.042  -0.156**  -0.219***  -0.214**  0.038  0.038  0.042 
  (0.078)  (0.088)  (0.090)  (0.068)  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.077)  (0.084)  (0.086)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.066) 
Region Montes de Maria  -0.028  -0.203  -0.213  0.020  0.157*  0.158*  -0.015  -0.217  -0.228  0.014  0.014  0.146 
  (0.121)  (0.168)  (0.166)  (0.087)  (0.089)  (0.086)  (0.116)  (0.155)  (0.152)  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.092) 
Region Norte de Santander  -0.089  -0.083  -0.079  0.140***  0.202***  0.197***  -0.078  -0.068  -0.063  0.139***  0.139***  0.203*** 
  (0.064)  (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.050)  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.062)  (0.077)  (0.076)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.042) 
Session Size    -0.005  -0.006     0.002  0.002     -0.006  -0.007*      0.001 
    (0.005)  (0.004)     (0.006)  (0.006)     (0.004)  (0.004)      (0.006) 
Proportion of Women in the Session    -0.051  -0.074     0.417**  0.416**     -0.028  -0.054      0.421** 
    (0.162)  (0.161)     (0.182)  (0.180)     (0.151)  (0.150)      (0.179) 
Average Age in the Session    0.003  0.003     -0.001  -0.001     0.001  -0.000      -0.001 
    (0.009)  (0.008)     (0.009)  (0.009)     (0.008)  (0.008)      (0.009) 
S.D. of Age in the Session    -0.014  -0.013     0.001  0.002     -0.014  -0.013      -0.000 
    (0.011)  (0.011)     (0.013)  (0.014)     (0.010)  (0.010)      (0.013)   46 
Average Education in the Session    0.183***  0.173**     0.149*  0.147*     0.170***  0.158**      0.151* 
    (0.070)  (0.072)     (0.083)  (0.083)     (0.064)  (0.066)      (0.081) 
S.D. of Education in the Session    0.034  0.027     0.150  0.141     0.064  0.061      0.154 
    (0.135)  (0.140)     (0.124)  (0.126)     (0.125)  (0.130)      (0.123) 
Average Months living in the neighb. in the Session    0.000  0.000     -0.000  -0.000     0.001  0.001      -0.000 
    (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.001) 
S.D. of Months living in the neighb. in the Session    -0.001  -0.001     0.001  0.001     -0.001  -0.001      0.001 
    (0.000)  (0.000)     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.001) 
Proportion of Urban Households in the Session    0.145  0.177     -0.266  -0.267     0.131  0.167      -0.260 
    (0.127)  (0.128)     (0.179)  (0.169)     (0.119)  (0.120)      (0.178) 
Proportion of Displaced households in the Session    0.351  0.334     0.026  0.014     0.409**  0.395*      0.053 
    (0.222)  (0.222)     (0.226)  (0.227)     (0.202)  (0.202)      (0.225) 
Proportion of Family Members in the Session    -0.717  -0.774*     -0.091  -0.124     -0.965**  -1.031**      -0.154 
    (0.478)  (0.462)     (0.402)  (0.410)     (0.471)  (0.458)      (0.402) 
Household Income      0.000       -0.000       0.000       
      (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       
Household Income Squared      -0.000       0.000       -0.000       
      (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       
Believes people are helpful in the community      0.037       0.009       0.039       
      (0.038)       (0.028)       (0.037)       
Believes people are reciprocal in the community      -0.029       0.026       -0.028       
      (0.042)       (0.031)       (0.041)       
Trusts the majority of people in the community      0.072*       0.029       0.076*       
      (0.040)       (0.047)       (0.040)       
Trusts few people in the community      0.039       0.015       0.042       
      (0.033)       (0.047)       (0.032)       
Proportion of Acquaintances in the Session      0.035       -0.022       0.084       
      (0.167)       (0.192)       (0.176)       
Proportion of Friends in the Session      0.027       -0.042       -0.037       
      (0.201)       (0.257)       (0.202)       
Decision in the First Round        0.296***  0.293***  0.293***          0.296***  0.296***  0.292*** 
        (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.037)          (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.037) 
Treated Household  -0.004  -0.003  -0.012  0.030  0.023  0.022  -0.040  -0.043  -0.052  0.031  0.031  0.018 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.049) 
Knows PRDP                0.089**  0.102***  0.105***  0.002  0.002  0.015 
                (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.033) 
                         
Observations  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  1472  1472  1472  1472  1472  1472 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   47 
Table A2. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  PRDP Municipality Level Effect   PRDP Municipality Level Effect (Matched Municipalities) 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
                                      
Female  -0.024  -0.027  -0.027  0.040  0.033  0.032  -0.047  -0.049*  -0.052*  0.048  0.046  0.044 
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Age (years)  0.003***  0.004***  0.004***  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  0.002**  0.003**  0.002**  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Urban  -0.009  -0.025  -0.026  0.033  0.029  0.031  0.008  0.000  0.001  0.048  0.049  0.054 
  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.057) 
Water by pipe  0.086**  0.078**  0.077**  -0.001  -0.005  -0.003  0.024  0.034  0.033  0.029  0.029  0.031 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.047) 
Sewage system  -0.044  -0.035  -0.035  0.002  0.013  0.013  -0.063  -0.054  -0.051  0.031  0.043  0.049 
  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.044) 
Rubbish recollection  -0.036  -0.023  -0.023  -0.074*  -0.066  -0.059  -0.023  -0.009  -0.008  -0.150***  -0.123**  -0.120** 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.044)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.054)  (0.049)  (0.047) 
Gas by pipe  -0.029  -0.048  -0.047  0.043  0.022  0.024  -0.002  -0.048  -0.045  0.065  -0.041  -0.035 
  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.046) 
Phone (landline)  0.018  0.014  0.014  0.054*  0.061*  0.069**  0.053  0.046  0.048  0.098**  0.087*  0.099** 
  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.047) 
Less than primary  0.061*  0.061*  0.062**  -0.032  -0.025  -0.022  0.037  0.034  0.038  0.019  0.020  0.028 
  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Full primary  0.038  0.033  0.035  0.003  0.007  0.012  -0.006  -0.016  -0.007  0.058  0.043  0.061 
  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.043) 
Some secondary  0.087**  0.068**  0.069**  -0.009  -0.015  -0.005  0.030  0.013  0.019  0.032  0.011  0.035 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.045) 
Full secondary +  0.116***  0.088**  0.084**  -0.022  -0.031  -0.015  0.074  0.062  0.053  -0.008  -0.010  0.006 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.054) 
Altitude   0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000**  -0.000**  -0.000**  0.000**  0.000*  0.000**  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Municipality development index  -0.002  -0.004  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Coca crops extension  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.002**  0.002**  0.002** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Murder rate (per 1000 inh.)  0.025  0.035  0.034  0.027  0.038  0.039  0.034  0.037  0.029  0.052  0.056  0.052   48 
  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.062)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
FeA Treatment Municipality  0.004  -0.027  -0.032  0.147*  0.094  0.094  0.001  -0.041  -0.054  0.112  0.018  0.011 
  (0.072)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.077)  (0.082)  (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.100)  (0.097)  (0.096) 
Missing Values: Sewage system  -0.174  -0.185  -0.170  0.115  0.143  0.164  -0.097  -0.095  -0.061  0.041  0.019  0.064 
  (0.262)  (0.272)  (0.277)  (0.261)  (0.239)  (0.225)  (0.300)  (0.320)  (0.319)  (0.209)  (0.221)  (0.201) 
Missing Values: Rubbish recollection  -0.065  -0.026  -0.015  0.034  0.082  0.048  -0.179  -0.142  -0.126  0.033  0.114  0.068 
  (0.248)  (0.250)  (0.250)  (0.272)  (0.231)  (0.236)  (0.263)  (0.269)  (0.273)  (0.293)  (0.240)  (0.242) 
Session size     0.006*  0.006*     0.014***  0.012***     0.006  0.006     0.016***  0.015*** 
     (0.004)  (0.004)     (0.004)  (0.004)     (0.005)  (0.004)     (0.005)  (0.005) 
Proportion of Women in the Session     -0.048  -0.053     -0.108  -0.099     -0.060  -0.098     -0.028  -0.029 
     (0.149)  (0.148)     (0.208)  (0.208)     (0.173)  (0.164)     (0.227)  (0.222) 
Average Age in the Session     0.001  0.001     -0.019**  -0.019**     -0.005  -0.007     -0.021  -0.023* 
     (0.009)  (0.009)     (0.009)  (0.009)     (0.011)  (0.011)     (0.013)  (0.013) 
S.D. of Age in the Session     -0.022  -0.021     -0.019  -0.018     -0.026  -0.021     -0.034*  -0.030* 
     (0.014)  (0.014)     (0.014)  (0.014)     (0.016)  (0.016)     (0.019)  (0.018) 
Average Education in the Session     0.171**  0.172**     -0.035  -0.026     0.076  0.079     0.097  0.117 
     (0.078)  (0.077)     (0.079)  (0.078)     (0.098)  (0.094)     (0.106)  (0.098) 
Proportion of Family Members in the Session     -0.038  -0.055     0.080  0.095     -0.377  -0.327     0.656  0.747* 
     (0.463)  (0.447)     (0.419)  (0.404)     (0.411)  (0.375)     (0.455)  (0.426) 
Household Income       0.000       -0.000*       -0.000       -0.000* 
       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000) 
Household Income Squared       -0.000       0.000       0.000       0.000 
       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000) 
Proportion of Acquaintances in the Session       -0.075       -0.170       -0.273*       -0.406** 
       (0.149)       (0.121)       (0.166)       (0.191) 
Proportion of Friends in the Session       0.312       -0.095       0.738***       0.410 
       (0.203)       (0.253)       (0.282)       (0.303) 
Decision in the First Round          0.391***  0.381***  0.382***          0.454***  0.449***  0.445*** 
          (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.029)          (0.043)  (0.039)  (0.038) 
Treated Location  0.256***  0.150*  0.135*  0.332***  0.305***  0.300***  0.221***  0.184*  0.141  0.313***  0.288***  0.263** 
  (0.059)  (0.083)  (0.082)  (0.065)  (0.099)  (0.100)  (0.071)  (0.102)  (0.098)  (0.075)  (0.110)  (0.104) 
                         
Observations  3674  3670  3670  3674  3670  3670  2170  2166  2166  2170  2166  2166 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   
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Table A3. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Individual Exposure Effect (Treatment Households)  Municipality Exposure Effect (Treatment Households) 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
                                      
Female  -0.012  0.008  0.019  0.079**  0.079**  0.079**  -0.010  0.005  0.016  0.079**  0.080**  0.078** 
  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.036) 
Age (years)  0.003  0.002  0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.004  0.003  0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Urban  0.047  -0.016  0.014  0.051  0.036  0.030  0.054  -0.007  0.026  0.048  0.033  0.027 
  (0.068)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.061)  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.059)  (0.053)  (0.055) 
Water by pipe  0.112*  0.099  0.093  0.007  0.010  0.017  0.109*  0.100  0.094  0.009  0.012  0.020 
  (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.063)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.049) 
Sewage system  -0.051  -0.014  -0.026  -0.046  -0.033  -0.033  -0.066  -0.024  -0.036  -0.036  -0.024  -0.024 
  (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.069)  (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.054) 
Rubbish recollection  -0.014  0.016  0.017  -0.086  -0.088  -0.086  -0.010  0.014  0.012  -0.091  -0.089  -0.086 
  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.067)  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.070)  (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.062) 
Gas by pipe  -0.076  -0.048  -0.047  -0.021  -0.037  -0.030  -0.073  -0.047  -0.046  -0.024  -0.038  -0.029 
  (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.037) 
Phone (landline)  -0.008  -0.030  -0.045  0.072  0.063  0.068  -0.005  -0.021  -0.034  0.075  0.059  0.066 
  (0.046)  (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.050) 
Less than primary  0.163  0.150  0.173*  -0.051  -0.059  -0.067  0.178*  0.157  0.183*  -0.064  -0.073  -0.084 
  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.103)  (0.070)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.097)  (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.076)  (0.072)  (0.072) 
Full primary  0.123  0.134  0.139  0.040  0.033  0.024  0.132  0.135  0.144  0.031  0.021  0.008 
  (0.113)  (0.112)  (0.114)  (0.071)  (0.068)  (0.071)  (0.111)  (0.114)  (0.115)  (0.076)  (0.073)  (0.076) 
Some secondary  0.107  0.070  0.087  -0.046  -0.056  -0.066  0.119  0.076  0.097  -0.057  -0.071  -0.082 
  (0.110)  (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.096)  (0.106)  (0.109)  (0.108)  (0.098)  (0.097)  (0.098) 
Full secondary +  0.213**  0.183*  0.152  -0.069  -0.083  -0.081  0.222**  0.184*  0.157  -0.079  -0.093  -0.098 
  (0.105)  (0.104)  (0.109)  (0.094)  (0.090)  (0.091)  (0.104)  (0.105)  (0.109)  (0.097)  (0.093)  (0.093) 
Female head of the household  -0.029  -0.030  -0.017  0.032  0.031  0.033  -0.020  -0.023  -0.007  0.030  0.028  0.029 
  (0.053)  (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.045) 
Family members younger than 18  0.006  0.016*  0.015*  -0.015  -0.018  -0.017  0.004  0.012  0.012  -0.013  -0.016  -0.015 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Displaced (self declared)  -0.118*  -0.151**  -0.151**  -0.015  -0.031  -0.025  -0.125**  -0.156**  -0.157**  -0.015  -0.034  -0.027 
  (0.061)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.045)  (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.059)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.045)  (0.053)  (0.052) 
Months living in the neighborhood  -0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000   50 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Owns house  0.025  0.036  0.043  -0.012  -0.003  -0.011  0.022  0.027  0.034  -0.007  0.007  -0.000 
  (0.042)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.043)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.036) 
Number of rooms  0.000  -0.001  -0.005  0.014  0.016  0.018  -0.004  -0.003  -0.007  0.016  0.017  0.019 
  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Top distribution assets  0.054  0.080  0.026  0.042  0.040  0.053  0.072  0.088  0.032  0.035  0.034  0.046 
  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.067)  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.068)  (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.048) 
Laboratorios de Paz  -0.053  -0.092*  -0.098*  -0.070  -0.080  -0.074  -0.049  -0.095*  -0.104*  -0.072  -0.077  -0.072 
  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.065)  (0.068)  (0.066)  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.065)  (0.070)  (0.068) 
Other support  0.063  0.060  0.060  0.045  0.044  0.048  0.057  0.058  0.057  0.053  0.053  0.057 
  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.035) 
Altitude   -0.000  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Municipality development index  -0.002  -0.010**  -0.010**  -0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.003  -0.010***  -0.011***  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Coca crops extension  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Murder rate (per 1000 inh.)  0.021  0.034  0.028  0.061***  0.067***  0.064***  0.035**  0.043*  0.037*  0.053**  0.057**  0.054** 
  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
Region Maciso Colombiano  0.045  -0.121  -0.103  0.110  0.195***  0.186***  0.024  -0.125  -0.110  0.119  0.199***  0.192*** 
  (0.079)  (0.085)  (0.085)  (0.081)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.070)  (0.082)  (0.085)  (0.078)  (0.067)  (0.067) 
Region Magdalena Medio  -0.131  -0.234**  -0.219*  0.155**  0.193***  0.202***  -0.201*  -0.273**  -0.261**  0.190***  0.226***  0.235*** 
  (0.108)  (0.115)  (0.120)  (0.079)  (0.070)  (0.068)  (0.110)  (0.117)  (0.122)  (0.073)  (0.069)  (0.068) 
Region Montes de Maria  -0.092  -0.267  -0.295*  0.128  0.204**  0.192**  -0.010  -0.195  -0.198  0.097  0.173*  0.152 
  (0.146)  (0.167)  (0.163)  (0.093)  (0.084)  (0.087)  (0.129)  (0.164)  (0.160)  (0.100)  (0.089)  (0.096) 
Region Norte de Santander  -0.108  -0.168**  -0.170**  0.224***  0.266***  0.262***  -0.128*  -0.189***  -0.195**  0.226***  0.272***  0.269*** 
  (0.086)  (0.074)  (0.079)  (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.080)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.041) 
Session size     0.004  0.003     -0.002  -0.003     0.005  0.004     -0.003  -0.004 
     (0.006)  (0.006)     (0.006)  (0.006)     (0.005)  (0.005)     (0.006)  (0.006) 
Proportion of Women in the Session     0.082  0.032     0.237  0.231     0.001  -0.052     0.300  0.289 
     (0.197)  (0.201)     (0.204)  (0.198)     (0.203)  (0.199)     (0.212)  (0.205) 
Average Age in the Session     0.012  0.015     0.007  0.009     0.011  0.013     0.007  0.009 
     (0.012)  (0.012)     (0.013)  (0.012)     (0.011)  (0.011)     (0.014)  (0.012) 
S.D. of Age in the Session     -0.029**  -0.029**     -0.009  -0.009     -0.024*  -0.022     -0.012  -0.014 
     (0.011)  (0.012)     (0.017)  (0.018)     (0.013)  (0.014)     (0.017)  (0.018) 
Average Education in the Session     0.254***  0.240***     0.141  0.153     0.233***  0.222***     0.155  0.165   51 
     (0.087)  (0.091)     (0.108)  (0.102)     (0.084)  (0.084)     (0.114)  (0.108) 
S.D. of Education in the Session     0.176  0.159     -0.035  -0.086     0.116  0.076     0.011  -0.028 
     (0.174)  (0.177)     (0.166)  (0.159)     (0.156)  (0.155)     (0.168)  (0.161) 
Average Months living in the neighb. in the 
Session     0.002**  0.002**     -0.001  -0.001     0.001*  0.001     -0.001  -0.001 
     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001) 
S.D. of Months living in the neighb. in the Session     -0.003***  -0.003***     0.001  0.001     -0.003***  -0.003***     0.001  0.001 
     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001) 
Proportion of Urban Households in the Session     0.003  0.042     -0.302  -0.332     -0.038  -0.013     -0.298  -0.319 
     (0.165)  (0.176)     (0.220)  (0.212)     (0.185)  (0.198)     (0.207)  (0.198) 
Proportion of Displaced households in the Session     0.489*  0.496*     -0.040  0.004     0.434*  0.431*     0.031  0.081 
     (0.257)  (0.263)     (0.293)  (0.268)     (0.240)  (0.244)     (0.276)  (0.256) 
Proportion of Family Members in the Session     -1.672***  -1.646***     0.714  0.692     -1.456***  -1.391***     0.545  0.511 
     (0.435)  (0.468)     (0.449)  (0.453)     (0.460)  (0.493)     (0.406)  (0.410) 
Household Income       0.000       -0.000**       0.000       -0.000** 
       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000) 
Household Income Squared       -0.000       0.000*       -0.000       0.000* 
       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000) 
Believes people are helpful in the community       0.033       -0.078**       0.041       -0.084** 
       (0.059)       (0.034)       (0.058)       (0.035) 
Believes people are reciprocal in the community       0.011       0.019       0.011       0.011 
       (0.061)       (0.049)       (0.062)       (0.050) 
Trusts the majority of people in the community       0.105       0.079       0.100       0.088 
       (0.069)       (0.062)       (0.071)       (0.061) 
Trusts few people in the community       0.060       0.018       0.067       0.019 
       (0.060)       (0.059)       (0.060)       (0.057) 
Proportion of Acquaintances in the Session       -0.111       -0.251       -0.210       -0.161 
       (0.245)       (0.259)       (0.241)       (0.260) 
Proportion of Friends in the Session       0.246       -0.161       0.220       -0.152 
       (0.308)       (0.438)       (0.315)       (0.421) 
Decision in the First Round          0.305***  0.312***  0.317***          0.314***  0.318***  0.322*** 
          (0.053)  (0.056)  (0.055)          (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.056) 
Treated Household                                 
                                 
Exposure (7-14 months)  0.045  0.010  0.019  -0.047  -0.058  -0.062                 
  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.043)  (0.046)                 
Exposure (>14 months)  0.085**  0.064  0.060  -0.014  -0.032  -0.023                   52 
  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.044)                 
Months of Exposure (Municipality Max)                  0.003**  0.002*  0.002*  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
                  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Months of Exposure (Individual)                  0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
                  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
                         
Observations  684  684  684  684  684  684  684  684  684  684  684  684 
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Table A4. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  PRDP Proportion Effect  PRDP Proportion Effect (interacted) 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
                                      
Female  -0.021  -0.021  -0.009  0.063**  0.063**  0.065**  -0.021  -0.022  -0.010  0.060*  0.061*  0.062** 
  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.030) 
Age (years)  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Urban  0.028  -0.032  -0.018  -0.001  -0.008  -0.005  0.029  -0.031  -0.016  0.003  -0.002  0.001 
  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Water by pipe  0.072*  0.063*  0.067*  0.009  0.016  0.019  0.071*  0.061*  0.066*  0.002  0.009  0.012 
  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
Sewage system  -0.028  -0.029  -0.033  0.018  0.015  0.015  -0.028  -0.029  -0.033  0.017  0.014  0.015 
  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Rubbish recollection  -0.059  -0.024  -0.029  -0.019  -0.002  -0.001  -0.059  -0.024  -0.030  -0.020  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Gas by pipe  -0.040  -0.021  -0.025  -0.023  -0.033  -0.032  -0.040  -0.020  -0.024  -0.021  -0.030  -0.030 
  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Phone (landline)  0.007  -0.005  -0.014  0.040  0.020  0.018  0.006  -0.005  -0.015  0.038  0.017  0.016 
  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
Less than primary  0.111*  0.130**  0.135**  -0.012  -0.005  -0.006  0.110*  0.130**  0.134**  -0.016  -0.009  -0.010 
  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.039) 
Full primary  0.092  0.112*  0.111*  0.043  0.041  0.040  0.091  0.111*  0.110  0.037  0.035  0.034 
  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Some secondary  0.105*  0.098  0.097  0.013  0.014  0.014  0.104*  0.096  0.095  0.004  0.003  0.003 
  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Full secondary +  0.166**  0.161**  0.141**  -0.019  -0.016  -0.016  0.165**  0.159**  0.139**  -0.028  -0.026  -0.026 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.068)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.067)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.058) 
Female head of the household  -0.048  -0.051*  -0.046  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002  -0.048  -0.050  -0.045  0.002  0.003  0.004 
  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.029) 
Family members younger than 18  0.018**  0.020**  0.020**  -0.007  -0.008  -0.009  0.018**  0.020**  0.020**  -0.007  -0.008  -0.009 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Displaced (self declared)  -0.083**  -0.090**  -0.086**  -0.025  -0.024  -0.022  -0.083**  -0.090**  -0.086**  -0.027  -0.026  -0.025   54 
  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
Months living in the neighborhood  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Owns house  -0.006  -0.008  -0.005  -0.031  -0.025  -0.025  -0.006  -0.008  -0.005  -0.031  -0.025  -0.026 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.028) 
Number of rooms  0.007  0.010  0.007  0.005  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.010  0.007  0.004  0.006  0.006 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Top distribution assets  0.000  0.001  -0.027  0.017  0.015  0.019  0.001  0.001  -0.027  0.019  0.016  0.020 
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.048) 
Laboratorios de Paz  -0.008  -0.024  -0.032  -0.078  -0.076  -0.078  -0.009  -0.026  -0.034  -0.085  -0.084  -0.087 
  (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.063)  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.068) 
Other support  0.048  0.050  0.051  0.034  0.036  0.036  0.048  0.049  0.050  0.033  0.035  0.035 
  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Altitude   -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000**  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000**  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Municipality development index  0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Coca crops extension  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Murder rate (per 1000 inh.)  0.027*  0.003  0.001  0.052***  0.050**  0.050**  0.027*  0.003  0.001  0.052***  0.050**  0.050** 
  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Region Maciso Colombiano  0.131**  0.096  0.102  0.124*  0.188***  0.185***  0.130**  0.094  0.100  0.120*  0.185***  0.181*** 
  (0.063)  (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.070)  (0.062)  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.072)  (0.063)  (0.066) 
Region Magdalena Medio  -0.105  -0.176*  -0.172*  0.072  0.066  0.069  -0.105  -0.176*  -0.172*  0.074  0.067  0.070 
  (0.089)  (0.097)  (0.099)  (0.067)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.089)  (0.097)  (0.099)  (0.068)  (0.066)  (0.065) 
Region Montes de Maria  0.029  -0.220  -0.229*  0.056  0.149*  0.150*  0.027  -0.224  -0.232*  0.044  0.136  0.138 
  (0.108)  (0.139)  (0.139)  (0.082)  (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.108)  (0.139)  (0.140)  (0.085)  (0.090)  (0.088) 
Region Norte de Santander  -0.070  -0.104  -0.103  0.150***  0.196***  0.190***  -0.069  -0.104  -0.103  0.151***  0.197***  0.190*** 
  (0.067)  (0.080)  (0.079)  (0.047)  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.067)  (0.080)  (0.079)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.046) 
Session size     -0.008*  -0.008*     -0.000  -0.001     -0.008*  -0.008*     -0.001  -0.001 
     (0.004)  (0.004)     (0.005)  (0.006)     (0.004)  (0.004)     (0.005)  (0.006) 
Proportion of Women in the Session     -0.150  -0.172     0.351**  0.347**     -0.152  -0.173     0.339*  0.336* 
     (0.162)  (0.162)     (0.175)  (0.173)     (0.163)  (0.163)     (0.175)  (0.173) 
Average Age in the Session     -0.003  -0.004     -0.005  -0.005     -0.003  -0.004     -0.006  -0.006 
     (0.008)  (0.008)     (0.010)  (0.009)     (0.008)  (0.008)     (0.010)  (0.009) 
S.D. of Age in the Session     -0.015  -0.014     -0.000  -0.000     -0.014  -0.014     -0.000  0.000   55 
     (0.009)  (0.009)     (0.013)  (0.013)     (0.009)  (0.009)     (0.013)  (0.013) 
Average Education in the Session     0.085  0.077     0.088  0.082     0.086  0.077     0.088  0.082 
     (0.063)  (0.064)     (0.083)  (0.083)     (0.063)  (0.064)     (0.083)  (0.084) 
S.D. of Education in the Session     0.099  0.091     0.191  0.186     0.100  0.091     0.198  0.190 
     (0.129)  (0.134)     (0.124)  (0.124)     (0.129)  (0.135)     (0.124)  (0.124) 
Average Months living in the neighb. in the 
Session     0.000  0.000     -0.000  -0.000     0.000  0.000     -0.000  -0.000 
     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001) 
S.D. of Months living in the neighb. in the Session     -0.001*  -0.001     0.001  0.001     -0.001*  -0.001     0.001  0.001 
     (0.000)  (0.000)     (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.000)  (0.000)     (0.001)  (0.001) 
Proportion of Urban Households in the Session     0.175  0.207*     -0.252  -0.252     0.172  0.204*     -0.262  -0.264* 
     (0.116)  (0.114)     (0.160)  (0.154)     (0.118)  (0.116)     (0.161)  (0.154) 
Proportion of Displaced households in the Session     0.369**  0.355*     0.045  0.036     0.369**  0.354*     0.053  0.040 
     (0.186)  (0.186)     (0.216)  (0.218)     (0.186)  (0.187)     (0.213)  (0.214) 
Proportion of Family Members in the Session     -0.802*  -0.865**     -0.151  -0.191     -0.805*  -0.868**     -0.168  -0.208 
     (0.447)  (0.435)     (0.419)  (0.427)     (0.448)  (0.437)     (0.397)  (0.404) 
Household Income       0.000       -0.000       0.000       -0.000 
       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000) 
Household Income Squared       -0.000       0.000       -0.000       0.000 
       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000) 
Believes people are helpful in the community       0.038       0.009       0.039       0.013 
       (0.038)       (0.028)       (0.038)       (0.028) 
Believes people are reciprocal in the community       -0.018       0.033       -0.017       0.037 
       (0.042)       (0.031)       (0.042)       (0.032) 
Trusts the majority of people in the community       0.068*       0.025       0.068*       0.024 
       (0.041)       (0.047)       (0.041)       (0.048) 
Trusts few people in the community       0.028       0.006       0.028       0.007 
       (0.032)       (0.046)       (0.032)       (0.047) 
Proportion of Acquaintances in the Session       0.067       -0.000       0.064       -0.014 
       (0.168)       (0.185)       (0.168)       (0.183) 
Proportion of Friends in the Session       -0.063       -0.109       -0.061       -0.110 
       (0.211)       (0.253)       (0.213)       (0.270) 
Decision in the First Round          0.289***  0.287***  0.288***          0.290***  0.287***  0.288*** 
          (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.037)          (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
Treated Household  -0.013  -0.006  -0.014  0.022  0.019  0.018  0.025  0.060  0.047  0.248*  0.265**  0.272** 
  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.145)  (0.153)  (0.154)  (0.129)  (0.124)  (0.124) 
Proportion of Treated in the Session  0.484***  0.550***  0.546***  0.346*  0.365*  0.386**  0.521**  0.614***  0.605***  0.584**  0.634**  0.664***   56 
  (0.177)  (0.147)  (0.154)  (0.200)  (0.189)  (0.180)  (0.214)  (0.223)  (0.223)  (0.264)  (0.256)  (0.251) 
Interacted (proportion * treated)                  -0.082  -0.143  -0.132  -0.518*  -0.564*  -0.582* 
                  (0.316)  (0.328)  (0.330)  (0.314)  (0.301)  (0.302) 
                         
Observations  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 